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Over the last few decades, the flow of international migration has increased steadily, and
Europe is no exception. At the same time, immigration has become more politically salient
in Europe. This growing volume of migration and the politicization of immigration raise
a series of questions. Who stands to benefit or be disadvantaged by the politicization of
immigration? What are the implications of the large-scale migration for sending countries?
The three essays of this dissertation explore different aspects of these questions.
In the first paper, I explore the political attributes of emigrants and how their exit affects
the distribution of voters in their home countries, focusing on Eastern Europe, where the
number of emigrants has been increasing since the EU enlargement. I find that emigrants
from Eastern Europe tend to be younger, highly educated, and politically more progressive,
hence the support for far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates.
In the second paper, I explore how political environments in host countries influence
immigrants’ political attitudes. Migrants’ experiences vary by the political environments in
host countries. When immigrants experience hostilities toward them, they likely become
dissatisfied with the political system of host countries. Using the various kinds of data
from 10 Western European countries, I find that when immigrants live in regions with high
support for far-right parties, they become more skeptical regarding democracy.
In the last paper, I explore how the growing salience of immigration affects parties’
welfare policy. The increasing salience of immigration creates a challenge for left-wing parties.
Conventionally, left-wing parties are committed to welfare expansion and pro-immigration
policies. Yet, left-wing parties rely on two different groups of constituents. While socially
liberal constituents tend to be pro-immigrant, the constituents with low-income tend to be
anti-immigrant. Given this dilemma, when immigration becomes salient, parties need to
adjust their policy to maximize their vote share. I find that when immigration becomes
salient and voters with anti-immigration views are disproportionately more from the low-
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The international migration flow has been on a steady increase over the last few decades
[1, 114]. In 2019 alone, approximately 272 million people (3.5 % of the global population)
migrated across borders, which is the highest volume of migration since the 1990s [114].
This upward trend is especially strong in Europe. Since the European Union expanded,
EU members have been experiencing rapid growth in immigration inflows from other EU
members, as well as from outside of Europe.
As the volume of migration grows, migration has become more politicized as well [30].
A recent Eurobarometer survey reports that 48 percent of Europeans in their sample select
immigration as the most salient issue, ahead of the economy and terrorism. At the same time,
nationalist backlashes against immigration have become pervasive across much of Europe,
from Brexit to the rise of various far-right parties. Far-right parties with anti-immigration
agendas like Alternative for Germany(AfD) or National Rally(Front) in France are no longer
niche parties. For instance, AFD won 92 seats out of 709 in the 2017 national election, and
Marine Le Pen of Front National made the runoff against Macron in the 2017 presidential
election.
This growing volume of migration and the rise of the anti-immigration sentiment raise
a series of questions. What are the political consequences of the politicization of the immi-
gration issues? Who stands to benefit or be disadvantaged by it? And finally, what are the
implications of this large-scale migration for sending countries? In this dissertation, I aim
to answer these questions by exploring the political implication of international migration
flows from both sending and receiving countries’ perspectives.
Conventionally, voluntary migration is studied mainly as an economic phenomenon.
Canonical theories in migration research perceive migration as a flow of labor forces and
migrants as economic actors or laborers. Accordingly, many studies focus on economic im-
pacts of migration including its impacts on labor market [e.g. 19], economic growth [80, 81],
fiscal gain (or loss) [37], and the distribution of income [106]. In fact, most voluntary migra-
tion is primarily motivated by economic reasons. According to the World Migration Report
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2020, two-third of the entire migrants are labor migrants [114].
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the impact of migration is only limited to the
economic sphere. Migrants are not only economic actors but also political actors. Immi-
gration brings new sets of political actors and their cultures as well as economic actors to
receiving countries. On the other hand, migration results in the loss of political and social
actors in sending countries.
A growing number of studies explore these political and cultural aspects of international
migration and their impacts on politics [e.g. 33, 46]. Especially for the last few years, there
have been lots of researches on the causes of anti-immigration sentiment in Western democ-
racies, focusing on its cultural aspects. Many of these works find that citizens form their
attitudes toward immigrants primarily based on cultural and social issues that immigration
may cause, rather than economic concerns [57, 130, 26, 61]. These confirm that migration
has multiple aspects, and migration brings in and takes out more than just labor forces
across borders. Depending on who migrants are, where they are from, and where they ar-
rive, international migration can have varying influences on politics through several different
channels.
Building on these works, in my dissertation, I view migration as the relocation of po-
litical actors as well as economic agents and explore how this movement of political actors
can influence political outcomes such as electoral outcomes, public opinion, and parties’ pol-
icy positions. The three essays of this dissertation explore different aspects of the political
implications of international migration. In the first essay, I study how emigration affects
the politics in sending countries. I examine the political and social attributes of emigrants
and how their departure affects the distribution of voters and electoral outcomes in their
home countries. Previous literature on emigration and its political impact mainly focuses on
remittances [e.g. 41, 43, 138]. However, emigration is not only a source of remittances but
also outflows of political actors. I argue that when politically progressive people leave, the
distribution of the remaining voters becomes more conservative and predisposed to support-
ing far-right parties. Thus, regions with more emigrants will have higher levels of support for
far-right parties. I empirically test these expectations in six Eastern European countries us-
ing individual-level survey and sub-national level data on emigration and election outcomes.
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I find that emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately politically progressive and
that the support for far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates.
In the second essay, I explore how political environments in host countries affect immi-
grants’ political attitudes. Immigrants’ political attitudes have important implications both
in receiving and sending countries. With the growing number of immigrants, the political
integration of immigrants has become one of the important policy goals for many Western
democracies [e.g. 141, 77]. At the same time, immigrants’ political opinions likely influence
politics in their home countries as well since immigrants play significant roles in transferring
new ideas and information to their home countries [117, 29, 56].
Many previous studies suggest that migrants in advanced democracies become more pro-
democratic and transmit democratic values to their home countries. However, migrants’
experiences with democracies are not necessarily all positive. Immigrants’ daily experiences
vary a lot by the political environments in host countries. I argue that when migrants expe-
rience hostilities, they likely become less attached to democratic values. Using an individual-
level survey of immigrants in 10 Western European countries, along with Bayesian hierar-
chical models and post-stratification, I find that when migrants live in regions with a strong
anti-immigration sentiment, they become more skeptical regarding democracy.
Lastly, in the third essay, I explore how the growing political salience of immigration
affects the welfare policy positions of parties. Many previous studies on the salience of
immigration primarily focus on its impacts on immigration policies or electoral outcomes.
Yet, the politicization of immigration can influence the welfare policy positions of parties as
well by reshaping political cleavages. The increasing salience of immigration introduces a
new cleavage that cuts across the economic left-right dimension. This new cleavage creates
a dilemma for left-wing parties in Europe. Left-wing parties are often committed to welfare
expansion and multiculturalism simultaneously. However, a significant portion of the left-
wing constituents are receptive to welfare expansion but do not necessarily support liberal
migration policies. Given this, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties
adjust their welfare policy positions to maximize their vote share. By maintaining their
conventional policy positions on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant
portion of their core constituents. At the same time, however, adjusting only immigration
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policy positions may not be enough to maintain electoral supports. For instance, if left-wing
parties takes a more conservative stance on immigration policy to accommodate their low-
income constituents, they may lose their socially liberal supporters [4, 55]. To compensate
for this loss, left-wing parties will need to adjust their other policy (welfare) to appeal to
other voters.
Applying the classic model of [123], I identify the conditions where left-wing parties
adjust their welfare policy positions. When voters whose views on immigration are at the
median are wealthier than average, left-wing parties converge to right-wing parties’ welfare
positions. I test these predictions in 10 European countries and find the supportive evidence
for this prediction using the Comparative Manifesto database along with several different
types of individual-level survey data.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on international migration and domestic
politics in several ways. First, by looking into both sending and receiving countries’ per-
spectives, I highlight that international migration can affect politics in sending and receiving
countries differently. While there have been many previous studies on the impacts of immi-
gration inflows on the politics of receiving countries, the political consequences of migration
in sending countries are relatively under-studied. By examining the political effect of migra-
tion in both sending and receiving countries’ perspectives, this dissertation points out that
migration flows are not just a domestic political issue but a global phenomenon that affects
multiple countries’ politics simultaneously.
This dissertation also adds to the literature on the rise of anti-immigration sentiment
and radical right-wing populism in Western democracies. The findings of this dissertation
suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment can have impacts beyond the immigration policy in
receiving countries. The second essay shows that the rise of anti-immigration parties can
potentially influence the politics in sending countries by shaping immigrants’ political atti-
tudes. Through the ideas spread by migrants, immigration politics in popular destination
countries such as Western Europe may have political impacts that extend beyond their bor-
ders. Similarly, the third essay also shows that the effects of the politicization of immigration
are not limited to immigration policies of receiving countries but also can extend to other
policy areas. This paper shows that the salience of immigration can influence the welfare
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policy positions of parties. These findings suggest that international migration is not an
isolated political or economic phenomenon. Future research should study the consequences
of international migration in broader areas.
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2.0 Electoral Consequences of International Migration in Sending Countries
2.1 Introduction
While Western Europe and the US are receiving large inflows of immigrants, many other
countries and regions are experiencing net outflows of their population. Over the last two
decades, Central and Eastern Europe have lost nearly 20 million people as a result of emigra-
tion, which is approximately 5.5 percent of their population [10]. When emigration occurs
on such a large scale, what are the electoral consequences in sending countries?
In this paper, I analyze the economic and political attributes of emigrants from Eastern
Europe and how their departure affects the electoral outcomes in their home countries.
These two inquiries are closely connected. Depending on the characteristics of emigrants,
their exit can have different effects on the distribution of the remaining population. I argue
that emigrants are different from those who remain in their political preferences as well
as economic profiles such that large-scale emigration affects the distribution of voters in
sending countries. In particular, emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately
more politically progressive, making the remaining pool of voters more conservative and
predisposed to supporting far-right parties. Thus, regions with a large number of emigrants
will have greater levels of support for radical right-wing parties.
I test these expectations in six Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004:
the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Estonia.1 They provide useful
cases for exploring the effects of emigration in sending countries. Previous studies show
that both sending and receiving countries can design their migration policies and control
migration volumes and flows according to their political interests [129, 104]. EU enlargement
has removed such institutional constraints on labor mobility within the EU. This is an
institutional shock at the individual level that lowers the cost of migration significantly. As
a result, Eastern Europe has been experiencing large-scale voluntary emigration since EU
1Eight Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004. Among these eight countries, I included six
countries whose emigration data is available at the sub-national level. The excluded countries are Hungary
and Lithuania.
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enlargement [140]. Exploiting this institutional change, this manuscript assesses the electoral
consequences of emigration based on the characteristics of emigrants.
To explore the emigrants’ characteristics, I use individual-level survey data from the
2010 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Life in Transition Survey
(LiTs) and the European Social Survey (ESS). Then I estimate the total effects of emigration
on electoral outcomes at the sub-national level, using regional emigration and electoral data
from six Eastern European countries from 2004 to 2018. To address the potential endogeneity
issues, I use instrumental variable analysis, leveraging the surge of Polish emigrants to the
UK after the EU enlargement. Finally, to investigate the potential effect of emigration on
individual policy preferences and vote choices, I use three waves of individual-level panel
survey data in Poland (POLPAN). The results of the analyses provide supportive evidence
for the argument of this manuscript. I find that (1) migrants from Eastern Europe tend
to be younger, more educated, and politically more progressive, (2) regions with a large
volume of emigration have higher levels of support for far-right parties, and that (3) regional
emigration can affect individuals’ policy preferences and voting behavior.
These findings help us to improve our understanding of the implications of international
migration from the perspective of sending countries [e.g. 79]. Also, this paper speaks to a
growing literature on geographical sorting, which focuses on the political division between
rural and urban areas in domestic politics [122, 99]. The findings of this manuscript suggest
that migration can facilitate geographical sorting of political preferences even across borders.
Finally, this manuscript provides a new angle for the growth of radical right-wing parties
in Eastern Europe. Whereas extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe have gathered
burgeoning scholarly attention [84, 52, 112, 105], their counterparts in Eastern Europe have
received relatively limited attention [e.g. 107, 22]. The emigration of progressive voters is
obviously not the only explanation for the recent growth of radical right-wing populism in
Eastern Europe [107, 21, 5]. However, the exit of voters who are least likely to be convinced
by far-right populism certainly makes the distribution of voters more favorable for radical
right-wing parties.
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2.2 Who Emigrates? Characteristics of Emigrants
In this section, I show that emigrants have different political preferences from individuals
who stay. Using two different types of survey data, I compare the economic and political
attributes of emigrants and stayers that affect their political support for far-right parties.
The canonical theories of emigration suggest that people migrate to maximize their
economic gains [18]. Young and highly educated people are more likely to emigrate to
advanced economies since they benefit more economically due to a wide wage gap in high-
skilled jobs and lower cost of leaving [73, 100]. Although the main drivers of emigration are
economic factors, emigrants also differ in their political attitudes.
Individuals’ economic attributes are often strongly associated with their political prefer-
ences. Education and age are strong predictors of individuals’ political preferences. Young,
highly educated people are relatively more pro-immigrant, and cosmopolitan [57], which are
salient cleavages that determine individuals’ political support, especially for far-right parties
[126, 5, 112]. This suggests that the emigration of young, highly educated voters results in
the exit of more cosmopolitan and pro-immigrant voters, who would be less likely to support
far-right parties if they stayed.
On the other hand, migrants also consider the political environments of the destination
countries when making migration decisions [46, 70]. Particularly, the internal migration
literature has demonstrated that individuals choose locations where political views are similar
to their own [122, 99]. Individuals whose preferences are strongly aligned with their home
countries are more likely to stay while those who are open to different cultures are more
likely to leave. Given that attachment to their home and attitudes toward different cultures
are some of the strongest predictors of far-right support [45, 112], emigrants are drawn more
from people who would be less likely to vote for far-right parties if they stayed.
To examine the characteristics of these emigrants, I use the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD) 2010 Life in Transition survey (LiTs) and European
Social Survey (ESS) data. LiTs allows us to explore the attributes of potential emigrants by
asking their willingness to emigrate. One limitation with LiTs is that it does not capture if
respondents actually emigrate. To complement this, I use the ESS, which captures a sample
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of emigrants from Eastern Europe who currently live in Western Europe as well as a sample
of people who remain in Eastern Europe.2 The limitation is that covariates of emigrants in
ESS are measured after the respondents emigrated and therefore might have been affected
by their migration experiences (post-treatment). Ideally, we would have longitudinal data
that captures both pre- and post-emigration attitudes. Unfortunately, there is no data avail-
able that tracks international migrants across borders. My approach provides a second best
option by showing consistent patterns across pre- and post-emigration.
Using both LiTs and ESS, I compare the distribution of emigrants and individuals who
remain across several dimensions. I compare their age and the level of education, which affect
their political attitudes as well as migration decisions.3 Then, I compare their attitudes
toward immigrants, which is a strong predictor of support for far-right parties [111, 112, 5].
Figure 1 presents the different distributions of (potential) emigrants and people who remain.
The red and gray color each represents (potential) emigrants and stayers.
The first and second row of figures is based on LiTs, and ESS, respectively. The first
column shows that emigrants are younger than individuals who stay across both datasets.
While the bulk of emigrants are in their twenties to thirties, stayers are distributed evenly
through their thirties to seventies. The second column shows that emigrants are relatively
more educated. LiTs shows that emigrants have a higher proportion in teritiary (5) or
higher, while ESS shows that the share of individuals with a higher degree than a teritary
education is larger in the emigrant sample. The third column shows how emigrants have
different attitudes toward immigrants. In both datasets, emigrants are more pro-immigrant
than individuals who stayed.4
2I use the ESS from Western European countries to capture a sample of emigrants while I use the ESS
conducted in Eastern European countries to capture a sample of people who stay in Eastern Europe. To
identify the emigrants, I use questions asking if respondents were born in a country of their current residence,
when and where they migrated. For more information, see Appendix (A.1.2)
3For emigrants respondents in ESS, I use the age of their emigration, instead of their current age to
compare the age of emigration decision. ESS wave 5 to 9 have questions regarding when they migrated
to the country they currently reside which allow us to calculate the age of emigrants’ departure while ESS
waves 1 to 4 do not ask the exact year of arrival. For this reason, I use ESS waves 5 to 9 only to compare
emigrants’ characteristics with stayers.
4It is challenging to measure emigrants’ attitudes toward immigrants. ESS has several questions asking
respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, when targeted respondents are emigrants, it makes them-
selves as immigrants in these questions. To address this issue, I use a question asking their attitudes toward
immigrants of different ethnicity or race as a proxy for their attitudes toward minorities and diversity in
general. For more explanation, see Appendix(A.1.2)
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LiTs (2010) : Willing vs. Not Willing to Emigrate
Age Education Anti-Immigrant
ESS (wave 5 - 9): Emigrants vs. Stayers
Figure 1: (Potential) Emigrant vs Stayers
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In sum, Figure 1 suggests that emigrants are younger, more highly educated, and pro-
immigrant. LiTs and ESS do not directly ask (potential) emigrants’ vote choice, which
prevents us from measuring emigrants’ support for far-right parties directly.5 However,
previous studies affirm that these attributes are a set of strong predictors of radical right-
wing support [e.g. 5, 28, 112].
To analyze the profiles of emigrants more systematically, I estimate a logistic model of
individuals’ willingness to emigrate on these attributes using the LiTs. The results in the
Table 1 shows consistent pattern with the figure 1. Both model 1, and 2 show that that
younger and more educated people are more willing to emigrate. In the model 2, I include a
vector of variables regarding individuals’ political attitudes. I include individuals’ attitude
toward democracy, which remains one of the salient political cleavages in Eastern Europe
[5] and if respondents voted in the most recent election to control for whether (potential)
emigrants are politically engaged more or less than (potential) stayers.6 Model 2 shows that
younger and more educated people are more willing to emigrate and have more positive
views of immigrants and democracy as well.
These results are consistent with the results from the ESS data reported in the table 2.7
As in the previous analyses, I use logistic model with country and year fixed effect. The
findings in the table 2 confirms that emigrants are likely to be younger, and more educated.
Also, emigrants tend to be ideologically more progressive, and pro-immigrant.
Overall, across different sources of data, I find that emigrants are disproportionately
drawn more from younger, more educated, and politically more progressive segments of the
population. These findings raise a following question: how does the departure of these
emigrants affect the electoral outcomes in sending countries? Would their emigration benefit
far-right parties in their home countries?
5ESS asks respondents which party they voted for in the most recent national elections in that country.
However, emigrants are not eligible to answer the question regarding their vote choice in national elections
of host countries.
6Emigrants can be less engaged in politics in expectation of leaving the country in the near future. For
instance, [53, 128]
7ESS and LiTs do not have the exact same set of questions, but they do have comparable questions. For
more information on questions from each dataset, see appendix(A.1)
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Satisfied with Econ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039)
Country FE X X
Observations 6,149 4,808
Log Likelihood −2,839.312 −2,274.514
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2: The Characteristics of Emigrants (ESS Wave 5-9)
Dependent variable: Emigrants
(1) (2)












Country (of origin) FE X X
Year FE X
Observations 30,358 30,358
Log Likelihood −1,481.117 −1,474.686
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.3 Emigration and Electoral Outcomes
Despite its magnitude, the effect of emigration on politics in sending countries has re-
ceived relatively little attention. One of the largest literatures on this topic focuses on
remittances. Diaspora communities can influence politics in their home countries by sending
financial or social remittances. Financial remittances from emigrants can affect recipients’
political attitudes and voting behavior by lowering their cost of political participation or
economic dependence on the domestic market [49, 3, 138, 137]. Financial remittances can
also have more direct influences on the survival of the political regime by funding politicians
or shaping public opinion [119, 43, 44, 15]. Some researches focus on the role of social remit-
tances such as ideas, information, and attitudes toward human rights or democratic values
transmitted through migrants [93, 117].
These studies show some channels of influence from emigration on sending countries’
politics. However, emigration is not only a source of capital inflows or ideas but also outflows
of political actors. Thus, by looking at the political influences from diaspora communities
only, we cannot capture the total effects of emigration.
On the other hand, the literature on brain drain looks into the effects of outflows of
emigrants from the perspective of human capital loss. A wide gap in income, especially
for high skilled jobs, can draw many highly skilled workers from developing to developed
countries. Scholars have been studying outflows of high-skilled laborers, focusing on its
economic effects [39]. They view emigrants primarily as economic actors, exploring the
economic effects of emigration such as fiscal loss [37], economic growth [80, 81], and income
distribution [106].
Recently, some studies look into the political effects of emigration through economic
channels. Using the case of Swedish emigration to the US, [82] show that labor shortages,
induced by emigration, could empower workers and allow them to demand welfare expansion.
Although these findings make valuable contributions to improving our understanding of the
effects of emigration, the fact that emigrants are self-selected political actors, as well as
economic actors, is still often overlooked in empirical research.8
8[82] did not find the evidence of self-selection by political features.
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Emigration results in not only a loss of labor but also a loss of political actors as well.
Especially when emigrants are disproportionately more from people with certain political
ideologies or preferences, their departure will have significant effects on electoral outcomes
in sending countries. This argument is also relevant to the ‘safety valve’ argument from the
literature on emigration policies in authoritarian regimes [103]. When politically disaffected
people leave [67], the authoritarian regimes may benefit from their exit due to the decrease
in (potential) domestic opposition. Thus, authoritarian governments can use emigration as a
safety valve for their regime [e.g. 42, 104]. My argument shares a logic similar to this theory
in that selective emigration can benefit certain political groups by changing the distribution
of the political preferences in sending countries.
As shown in the previous section, emigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be younger,
more educated, and politically more progressive than those who stay. In other words, em-
igrants are drawn more from people who are less likely to vote for far-right parties if they
stayed. Thus, their departure will benefit far-right parties by making the distribution of the
electorate more conservative. Of course, the emigration of progressive voters is not the sole
explanation for the recent growth of far-right parties in Eastern Europe. However, it makes
the distribution of voters more favorable for far-right parties.
It should be noted that emigration does not necessarily prevent emigrants from voting
[2]. Many countries provide de jure external voting. All six countries in the sample also allow
de jure external voting as of 2006.9 However, the presence of de jure external voting system
does not guarantee the same de facto chances of voting for migrants. Migration reduces
individuals’ propensity to vote by increasing the cost of voting by a significant amount.
Emigrants often need to visit polling stations to vote. Yet, there are only a few of them, and
they are located only in metropolitan areas, which are hardly accessible to many migrants
[66]. Using the data from post-communist countries which include all six countries in our
sample, [87] found that turnouts for external voting are significantly lower than for domestic.
Therefore, emigration changes the electorate in sending countries despite the presence of de
jure external voting system.
9The Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced external voting in 2002 and 2006, respectively. The other
four countries introduced it at the time of their first legislative elections since the democratization [87].
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In sum, I argue that the emigration of young, highly educated, and politically progres-
sive people who unlikely vote for far-right parties if they stayed, benefits far-right parties
in sending countries by changing the distribution of electorates in sending countries more
favorable to them. Whereas emigration may have further effects on electoral outcomes by
induing demographic and societal changes, in this paper, I aim to capture the overall impact
of emigration on the support for radical right wing parties.
2.4 Research Design
My theory leads to the hypothesis that the vote share of far-right parties is greater in
regions where the share of emigration is larger.I start by exploring this hypothesis at the
sub-national level, using the data on migration and electoral outcomes from six Eastern
European countries.
For the sub-national unit analyses, I use NUTS 3, which is the most disaggregated
regional unit that is comparable across EU countries.10 I use data on emigration and par-
liamentary election outcomes at the NUTS 3 level, collected from the national statistics
offices of each country.11 To measure the level of regional emigration, I use the number of
permanent or long term migrants who spend longer than a year outside of their country of
origin. A good portion of migrants from Eastern Europe are short term or seasonal workers
who return to home countries within a few months [e.g. 115]. Whereas short-term migration
may potentially affect politics in sending countries through different channels, it is unlikely
to change the distribution of electorates since seasonal workers likely vote at their home.
Therefore, in this paper, I focus on the long-term and permanent emigrants to estimate the
effects of emigration on the electoral outcomes.12
10NUTS 3 is defined as ”small regions for specific diagnoses” by Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/web/nuts/background). For more explanation on NUTS 3 region in each country, see appendix
(A.2.1).
11For more information on data source, see Appendix (A.2)
12Statistical office of each country uses different methods to acquire the emigration data: Some require
the registration to their citizens for changes in residency (Estonia, Poland), while others use administrative
data such as national health system (Latvia) or implement the extensive annual survey (Slovenia, Slovakia,
Czech Republic). For more information regarding each data source, see appendix(A.2.2)
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To code far-right parties, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data [12, 11].
CHES provides an indicator for ideological positions of parties in Europe and specifies their
party family based on the survey of experts of each country’s politics.13 Using CHES’
classification for radical right-wing parties, I code far-right parties in the sample. Table
3 reports the list of far-right parties in Eastern Europe since EU enlargement. Most of
these parties are classified as radical right-wing parties in other datasets (e.g. Comparative
Manifesto Data) and previous studies except Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. Whereas
CHES classifies PiS as a radical right-wing party from the early 2000s, some previous studies
consider PiS as center-right until the mid 2000s, and instead consider League of Polish
Families (LPR) to be a radical right-wing party [e.g. 108, 21].14 In the appendix, I replicate
the results using this alternative coding that classifying LPR as a far-right party in the 2005
and 2007 elections. The results are consistent in terms of the direction of the coefficients
and their statistical significance.15
For the analysis, I estimate variants of the following model:
Far-Right Votet,i = βEmigrationi,t−1 + Zi,t−1γ + φi + ψt
where i indexes NUTS 3 regions, and t election years. Far-Right Votei,t is the vote share of
the radical right-wing parties whereas Emigrationi,t−1 is the proportion of emigrants in the
voting eligible population, one year lagged.
The term Zi,t−1 represents a vector of regional confounders that could affect the support
for far-right votes and emigration rate at the same time. This includes regional GDP,
unemployment rate, immigration inflows. Lastly, I include NUTS 3 region fixed effects (φi)
meant to account for unobserved region-specific, time-invariant factors, and ψt represents
year fixed effects, meant to control unobserved time-specific factors.
13CHES follows [68] to code party family, and classifies agrarian and confessional parties separately. For
more detail, see [11].
14CHES classifies LPR as a confessional party, and Comparative Manifesto Project data consider LPR as
Christian Democratic Party while classifying PiS as a conservative party.
15For the results with the alternative coding for far-right parties are reported in Appendix 2.4
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2.5 Findings
Table 4 reports the regression results of vote share of the far-right parties on the emigra-
tion share of the electorates at t− 1 for six countries. All results are based on OLS models
with both year and region fixed effects. The coefficients of the explanatory variable are
signed as expected. Emigration positively correlates with the votes for the far-right parties.
This relationship is statistically significant and consistent with the argument that emigration
benefits the growth of far-right parties across different models. The size of the coefficients
from some model specifications is larger than one might expect solely from changes to the
distribution of the electorates. It suggests that emigration may have effects on electoral
outcomes through channels other than changing the distribution of voters, such as affecting
the policy preferences of individuals who remain in their home countries. This is further
investigated in section 2.6.2.
Another interesting finding is that immigration has no significant effect on the dependent
variable. Previous studies of Western Europe have found correlations between the growth
of far-right parties and inflows of immigrants [e.g. 51, 9, 83]. However, in our sample, the
number of immigrants does not affect far-right votes significantly. This implies that we
cannot generalize the experience of popular immigration destination countries to sending
countries.
Whereas model 1 includes only the emigration share along with region and year fixed
effects, model 2 - 4 include different regional confounders. In particular, in model 4, I include
lagged dependent variable in addition to other regional covariates. Although I control for the
regional-level economic confounders such as GDP and unemployment rate as well as region
fixed effect that account for unobserved factors that are specific for each region, there still
can be other sources of endogeneity that may bias our estimates. For instance, politically
more progressive people may leave their home country because they expect far-right parties
to grow in the future. To control for each region’s propensity to support for far-right parties,
I use the vote share of far-right parties in the previous election (lagged dependent variable) as
a proxy for the expected growth of far-right parties. Modeling the lagged dependent variable
also address potential serial correlation in the dependent variable in the panel data.
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Table 3: Far-Right Parties in Eastern Europe
Country Election Year Far-Right Parties
Slovakia 2006, 2010, 2012 2016
Slovenska nacionalna stranka (SNS)
(Slovak National Party)
Slovenia 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018
Slovenská národná strana (SNS)
(Slovenian National Party)
Poland 2005, 2007. 2011, 2015
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS)
(Law and Justice)
Latvia 2006, 2011, 2014, 2018
Nacion¯al¯a apvien¯iba “Visu Latvijai!”—
“T¯evzemei un Br¯iv¯ibai/LNNK”(TB-LNNK)
(National Alliance, ”All for Latvia,
for Fatherland and Freedom!/LNNK” )
Czech Republic 2015, 2017
Úsvit p˘ŕımé demokracie (Úsvit)
(Dawn of Direct Democracy)
Svoboda a př́ımá demokracie (SPD)
(Freedom and Direct Democracy)
Estonia 2015, 2019
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE)
(Conservative People’s Party of Estonia)
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2004-2019)
Table 4: Emigration and Vote Share of Far-right Parties
Dependent variable:
Vote Share of Far-right Parties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emigration 2.135∗ 4.966∗∗ 9.148∗∗∗ 6.207∗∗∗
(1.207) (1.998) (2.432) (2.306)






NUTS 3 FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Lagged DV X
Observations 409 394 352 333
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.6 Emigration and Electoral Outcomes in Poland
To test the robustness of the results and investigate the potential impacts of emigration
on individuals’ vote choices, I conduct a more rigorous empirical test with the case of Poland.
Even when controlling for economic confounders and including lagged dependent vari-
ables across different model specifications, there can still be remaining unobservable variables
that may affect emigration rates and vote share of far-right parties simultaneously. This en-
dogeneity can bias our estimates.
Also, migration may affect electoral outcomes through channels other than changing the
distribution of electorates. Emigration may affect the policy preferences and vote choices of
those who remain in their home countries. Large-scale emigration can induce societal and
demographic changes that could have downstream effects on individuals’ voting behavior.
Poland provides a useful test case for investigating these possibilities. Historically, Poland
has been one of the largest sending countries in Europe, and is a country where emigrants
outnumber immigrants [78]. The volume of immigrants in Poland has been gradually in-
creasing. Yet, the net migration of Poland has remained negative due to their even faster
growth in emigration. Since Poland joined the EU in May 2004, their emigration to other
EU countries has increased even more. Particularly, migration to the UK, which allowed
Polish workers full access to their labor market immediately after the accession, was the
main driver of post-EU growth in emigration rates [115]. As of 2006, the year in which
the annual long-term/permanent emigration rate peaked, 47,000 Polish workers left Poland,
which is more than twice the number of emigrants in pre-EU periods.
In addition to its substantive importance, focusing on the case of Poland allows us to
adopt a few empirical strategies to address potential endogeneity issues and investigate the
direct effects of emigration on individual policy preferences. First, I address endogeneity by
using an instrumental variable approach, exploiting the fact that the growth of Polish emi-
gration in the post-EU accession period has been driven mostly by an increase in emigration
to a single destination country (UK). I leverage the exogeneity of economic conditions in the
UK to construct an instrument.
Second, to identify the effects of emigration on policy preferences of individuals who
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remain, I use a panel survey of a nationally representative sample of Polish citizens between
2008 and 2013, the Poland Panel Survey (POLPAN). This panel survey data allows us to
investigate the impacts of regional-level emigration on the remaining individuals’ political
attitudes.
2.6.1 Endogeneity
An ideal instrument should be exogenous to regional voting outcomes but strongly cor-
related with emigration rates. Although it is challenging to find such instruments, previous
studies in the migration literature use a shift-share logic to address this issue. They predict
a country’s emigration rates using the economic condition of the destination country, inter-
acted with the past emigration patterns in sending countries [e.g. 106, 121, 7]. This idea
builds on the fact that the economic condition of the destination country exogenously affects
the emigration rates from the sending country (treatment), but the intensity of this impact
could vary across regions by their previous emigration patterns (intensity of treatment).
The economic condition of the destination country is a strong pull factor for migrants.
It likely affects emigration rates, and yet is exogenous to regional voting outcomes in the
sending country. While the economic condition of the destination predicts the emigration
rates at the national level, the intensity of its impact should vary across regions. To capture
the regional variation, previous studies have used the past emigration rate of each region
[106, 121]. The past emigration rate is a proxy for the presence of pre-existing social networks,
which are some of the strongest predictors of emigration flows [e.g. 97]. By interacting the
economic condition of the destination with the past emigration rates, previous studies were
able to construct instruments for the region-specific emigration rates [106, 121, 132].
Following this approach, I construct the instrument for regional emigration rates in
Poland by interacting the unemployment rates in the UK (the exogenous pull factor) and
the past emigration rates of each region in Poland before the EU accession. A majority
of Polish emigrants’ destinations have been Germany and the UK. Approximately 62 % of
emigrants went to these two countries (2011 census) [115].16 Although historically Germany
16The third most popular destination is the US, which receives 8 % of the emigrants, followed by Nether-
lands (4 %).
21
has been a more popular destination than the UK, the emigration rates to the UK have
increased dramatically after the EU accession. Since the UK allowed full access to their
labor market immediately after the EU enlargement in 2004, the emigration rates to the UK
have increased 28 % compared to the pre-accession period, whereas the emigration rate to
Germany has remained consistent. In the 2 years after the EU accession, the UK became
the most popular destination country (receiving 33% of emigrants) for Polish emigrants post
EU accession [115].17 This allows me to leverage the economic condition of the UK as an
exogenous pull factor that affects the emigration rates of Poland. Among other economic
indicators, I use unemployment rates in the UK to measure the demand for labor inflow.18
To capture the regional variation in tendency to migrate from Poland, I interact the
unemployment rate of the UK with the regional emigration rates prior to the EU accession,
following approaches similar to the previous studies [106, 121, 132]. The higher past emi-
gration (pre-EU) of a region is, the larger impacts the economic condition in the UK would
have on the emigration rates in that region. I use the emigration rate in 2003, a year before
the EU enlargement. 19 The equation below summarizes the IV strategy:
Emigrationi,t = βEmigrationi,preEU ∗UK Unemploymentt−1 + Zi,t−1γ + φi + ψt (First Stage)
Far-Right.Votet,i = β ̂Emigrationi,t−1 + Zi,t−1γ + φi + ψt (Second Stage)
where i indexes NUTS 3 regions and t indexed election years post EU accession.
Emigrationi,preEU refers to the share of emigrants in the region i prior to the EU enlarge-
ment. Both equations include a vector of confounders such as GDP, unemployment rates,
and immigration inflows, (Zi,t−1) as well as region specific and year fixed effects (φi, ψt).
17While EU accession reduced the mobility restriction for Polish citizens overall, only the UK, when
Ireland and Sweden, allowed Polish workers unconditional, full access to their labor market immediately.
Other countries in the EU gradually opened their labor market. In 2011, Poland gained full access to the
labor market of every EU member, with Germany and Austria finally fully opened their labor market.
18Some studies use GDP growth as a proxy for the economic condition that affects labor demand and
migration [e.g. 7]. The results are consistent when using this measure (Appendix A.3.3).
19Ideally, we would have data on the past emigration rates by destination, which would allow me to use
the past emigration rates to the UK exclusively to build an instrument. However, such data is not available
at the sub-national level. For a robustness check, in the appendix, I use the emigration share in 2004, the
year of EU enlargement, instead of pre-EU emigration rates (Appendix A.3.2). This identification leverages
the fact that emigration to the UK has increased almost exclusively immediately after the EU enlargement
due to the free access to the UK labor market.
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The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the additional increase/decrease of emigra-
tion rates in regions where emigration rate in pre-EU period is high relative to regions with
lower level of the emigraiton in pre-EU period. I use this additional differences in emigrant
share to identify a causal effect of emigration on vote share of far-right parties.
Table 5: Instrumental Variable Analysis (Poland)
Dependent variable:
Vote share of Far-Right Party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emigration 7.112∗ 22.943∗∗∗ 9.438∗∗ 19.490∗∗ 7.478∗∗ 15.030∗
(3.694) (8.867) (4.604) (8.802) (3.558) (8.273)
Immigration 6.101 1.778 12.358 8.943
(13.526) (14.190) (12.630) (13.220)
Unemployment 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP −0.015∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
NUTS 3 FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
Lagged DV X X
Estimator OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
First Stage F 52.47∗∗∗ 43.730∗∗∗ 42.106∗∗∗
N 285 285 258 258 258 258
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
This IV approach relies on an assumption that there are no other ways that the eco-
nomic condition of the UK affects the voting results differently across regions by their past
emigration rates, except through the current emigration rates. One might argue that there
are some unobserved differences between the regions with high past emigration rates and
those with low past emigration rates that may also be correlated with voting results post
EU accession. For instance, political conditions before EU accession might simultaneously
affect the pre-EU emigration rates as well as the voting results in later years.
First, to address such potential issues, I control for the vote share of far-right party in
the previous election, including the voting outcomes in pre-EU periods (2001 parliamentary
election). Also, I include regional economic confounders such as GDP and unemployment
rates as covariates, in addition to regional fixed effects, to account for potential economic
23
conditions that push emigrants and affect voting results simultaneously. Finally, I would
like to emphasize that the instrument does not only rely on the past emigration rates per
se but also builds on the exogenous economic condition of the destination country. Even
though there are unobserved differences across regions by their pre-EU emigration rates, it
is hard to think of a channel where economic conditions in the UK affect the voting results
differently by the past emigration rates, except through differences in post-EU emigration
rates.
Table 5 reports the results of both OLS and IV estimates for Poland around the EU
enlargement. Overall, the results from the table 5 are consistent with the previous analyses,
suggesting that emigration benefits the electoral success of far-right parties at the regional
level. As more emigrants leave, the far-right party gains more vote share at the regional
level. These relationships are statistically significant across models. This is consistent when
controlling the lagged dependent variable as well (model 5, 6). Across all model specifica-
tions, the IV coefficient estimates are larger than the OLS estimates but their confidence
intervals overlap. As in the previous analyses, the size of the coefficient suggests that the exit
of politically progressive voters may have second-order effects on voting outcomes beyond
the immediate direct effect from emigration on the distribution of voters.
2.6.2 Emigration and Individual Voting Behavior
Finally, there are several reasons to believe that emigration influences policy preference
and voting behavior of people who remain behind. Large scale emigration induces demo-
graphic changes that could have downstream effects on individuals’ voting behavior as well
as direct impacts on the distribution of voters.
First, emigration can raise concerns regarding sustainability of traditional and local com-
munities among the people who are left behind. Emigration of family members or neighbors
leave psychological distress to those who remain behind. This includes feelings of abandon-
ment and concerns about losing the cultural roots of their communities [95]. As younger
and more educated segments of their populations leave, the remaining people may become
more worried about the sustainability of their communities and traditional cultures. Given
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that the attachment to the traditional values and social capital of local communities are
some of the strongest predictors of individual support for far-right parties [45, 17], regional
emigration rates could affect the voting behavior of people who remain.
In the same vein, emigration also induces changes in the social networks that migrants
leave behind [95], which could affect the political attitudes of the remaining people. As
politically more progressive people leave, the people who remain behind will have fewer
chances to interact with more progressive political views, and their networks become more
uniform in terms of political opinions. Previous studies in political behavior demonstrate
that homogeneous networks lead people to be less tolerant of other political views and to be
more radical by reducing their chances to be exposed to oppositional views [110, 72].
In this paper, I do not aim to isolate the role of each potential mechanism that may
drive the effects of regional emigration on individuals’ support for far-right parties. These
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Plausibly, voters could be affected through more
than one mechanism at a time. I aim to capture the overall impact of regional emigration
share on individuals’ support for far-right parties, which shows that emigration not only
changes the distribution of the electorates but also directly influences the voting behavior of
people who are left behind.
To estimate the effect of regional emigration share on support for far-right parties at the
individual level, I employ the individual-level data from the most recent three waves of Polish
Panel Study (POLPAN). Since the EU enlargement, POLPAN is carried out every five years,
from 2008 to 2018. Each wave of the survey asks which party respondents support, as well
as their demographic information and place of residence. Using the information regarding
the place of residence of the respondents, I estimate the effects of regional emigration share
on individual vote choice. 20
The three waves of the POLPAN covered the time after the EU accession, which allows
us to estimate the effects of large-scale emigration on individuals’ policy preferences and
behavior. As in the regional-level analysis, I control for regional economic variables including
immigration, unemployment rate and GDP. In addition, I include a vector of individual-
20While I use NUTS 3 region for the sub-national level analysis in the previous section, the data is only
available at NUTS 2 level in POLPAN data, and regional emigration share is computed accordingly.
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Table 6: Regional Emigration Exposure and Support for Far-Right Parties (POLPAN)
Dependent variable:
Vote for Far-Right Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Level
Age 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Education (BA) −0.131∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Unemployed −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.0001
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Regional Level
Emigration 0.685 1.530∗∗ 2.147∗∗∗ 5.195∗∗∗
(0.652) (0.732) (0.796) (1.741)






NUTS 1 FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 3,349 3,349 3,349 3,349
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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level variables, accounting for demographic characteristics such as gender, age, the level
of education, and employment status. The dependent variable is binary variable that takes
value one if respondents voted for far-right party (PiS) in the most recent national election.21
Table 6 reports the results of both a random effect model that accounts for the repeated
observations of individuals. Column 1-3 show the coefficients of linear models with random
effects varying across individuals with panel wave fixed effects. Column 4 uses instrumental
variable strategy from the previous section. The effect of the regional share of emigration on
the propensity to vote for far-right party is positive and mostly statistically significant across
different model specification. These results affirm that the emigration affects the electoral
outcomes at the sub-national level not only by changing the distribution of electorates, but
also by directly affecting individual political preferences.
2.7 Conclusion
What are the electoral consequences of emigration in sending countries? This paper
investigates the characteristics of emigrants and how their departure affects the electoral
outcomes in sending countries. Using individual-level survey and regional (NUTS 3) mi-
gration data, I find that emigrants from Eastern Europe are disproportionately more from
politically progressive populations, and the level of support for far-right parties is higher in
regions with large levels of emigration.
These findings have several implications for the literature. First, they suggest that in-
ternational migration affects sending and receiving countries differently. It is a common
assumption that globalization makes the world more diverse. Yet, increased mobility can
facilitate geographical sorting by political preferences. When emigrants are disproportion-
ately more from politically progressive populations as shown, emigration can make society
more homogeneous in sending countries. Second, this paper provides one explanation for
the recent growth of radical right-wing populism in Eastern Europe. Many previous studies
look into the electoral success of far-right parties in Europe but mostly focus on Western
21parliamentary election in 2007, 2011, and 2015.
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Europe. They point to Western European countries’ experiences with globalization as the
main driver behind this backlash. Eastern Europe has had vastly different experiences with
economic globalization from their Western counterparts, yet they also have experienced the
rapid rise of radical right-wing parties. This demonstrates how different experiences with
globalization can result in similar political backlashes.
This paper has some limitations, and more needs to be done in future research. First,
this paper’s empirical strategy focuses on capturing the total effect of emigration, not em-
pirically testing potential mechanisms. As the results suggest, the effects from the exit of
politically progressive voters on electoral outcomes likely go beyond its direct influences on
the distribution of remaining voters. As table 6 suggests, emigration could have more direct
impacts on individual policy preferences and voting behavior. Future research should explore
these potential paths by which emigration influences politics.
Also, this paper focuses on Eastern Europe only, which raises the question of how gen-
eralizable the results are. The pattern of migrants’ selection and their characteristics can
vary by case. However, this manuscript still provides an insight that large-scale emigration
can induce changes in electorates depending on the attributes of emigrants. For a more
comprehensive understanding of the political impacts of emigration, future research should
expand on how different migration selection processes influence politics in sending countries
differently.
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3.0 The Rise of Far-right Parties and Immigrants’ Political Attitudes
3.1 Introduction
What shapes immigrants’ political attitudes? Do politics in host countries affect immi-
grants’ political attitudes? This paper examines how political environments in host countries
influence immigrants’ political attitudes at the sub-national level. I focus on the impacts
of the success of far-right parties on immigrants’ attitudes toward democracy in Western
European countries.
Immigrants’ political attitudes have important implications both domestically and inter-
nationally. Given the growing number of immigrants, the successful integration of newcomers
has been an important policy goal in many Western democracies [e.g. 141, 77]. Particularly,
with the increasing political salience of the immigration issue, political integration has be-
come one of the crucial aspects of the integration process [34, 35].
At the same time, immigrants’ attitudes affect politics in their home countries as well.
Many studies suggest that immigrants play significant roles in the democratization and
consolidation of democracy in their home countries [e.g 117, 29, 15, 56]. Immigrants in
advanced democracies likely become more pro-democratic due to their experiences with
democratic culture and institution [14, 56] and transmit these values and attitudes back to
their home countries [23, 56].
The premise of this argument is that immigrants’ have positive experiences with demo-
cratic political culture and institutions so that eventually they become more supportive
of the democracy and political system of host countries [38, 117]. Yet, even in advanced
democracies, immigrants’ experiences with politics are not necessarily always positive but
vary a lot by the political environments of the host countries. Especially, for the last decade,
with a growing anti-immigration sentiment, many Western European countries have been
experiencing the rapid growth of radical right-wing parties whose main political agenda
is anti-immigration [52]. These growing hostilities and electoral success of radical right-
wing parties may lead immigrants to have negative experiences with host countries’ political
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processes. How do these hostile political environments affect migrants’ political attitudes,
especially toward democracy and the political system of Western democracies?
To answer these questions, I examine the relationship between the support for far-right
parties and anti-immigration sentiment among citizens and immigrants’ attitudes toward
the political system in host countries at the sub-national level. It is crucial to investigate
this relationship at the sub-national level instead of at the country level for several reasons.
Although far-right extremism has been growing all across Europe, the electoral success of
far-right parties widely varies across regions, even within the same country. The volume of
immigrants’ inflow and experiences with economic globalization, in general, differs massively
by region, which leads to a geographical division in public opinion toward immigrants, and
support for radical right-wing parties [27, 99].
Furthermore, political environments at the local level likely impact immigrants’ daily
experiences with politics and the society of host countries more directly. Vote share of far-
right parties are highly correlated with anti-immigration sentiment in the region [e.g. 27].
Immigrants’ everyday experiences in regions with a high level of anti-immigration sentiment
could massively differ from those who live in areas with pro-immigrant and cosmopolitan
cultures.
To investigate this relationship, (1) I estimate immigrants’ political attitudes at the sub-
national level, then (2) examine the relationship between immigrants’ political opinion and
vote share of radical right-wing parties. To estimate the immigrants’ political attitudes at
the sub-national level, I use Bayesian multilevel regression with post-stratification, or MRP,
along with the individual-level survey data (European Social Survey) from 9 Western Euro-
pean countries. MRP provides reliable public opinion estimates at the sub-national level by
adjusting estimates from non-representative samples with information about the population
distribution (Census). When it comes to estimating the immigrants’ opinion, adjusting the
non-representative sampling is far more salient since the sample size of immigrants in the
survey is even smaller than the sub-national level sample of all respondents. Using this
method, I find that immigrants who live in regions with a high level of support for far-right
parties are less supportive of democracy and host countries’ political systems in general.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this study adds
30
to the study of the impacts of far-right extremism on politics. Given a growing radical
right extremism in Europe, many previous studies explore the causes and consequences
of far-right parties in domestic politics [e.g. 134, 52, 27]. Yet its impacts on immigrants’
political attitudes are relatively underexplored despite of its importance 1. Considering that
immigrants play important roles in transmitting political values to their home countries
[117, 14, 15, 56], the impacts of right-wing populism on immigrants have important political
implications beyond the border of host countries. Given that many sending countries are
new democracies, the transmission of immigrants’ negative attitudes toward democracy could
degrade public support for democracies, potentially contributing to democratic backsliding
in their home countries.
Second, my analysis estimates the immigrants’ political attitudes at the sub-national
level in Europe, applying the MRP. This paper is not the very first attempt to examine the
impacts of right-wing extremism on immigrants’ political opinions [e.g. 75]. While previous
studies examine this relationship at the country level, this paper examines it at the sub-
national level. With the deep regional variation in popular support for right-wing extremism
[99], the sub-national level analysis provides a more detailed examination of the relationship
between political environments and immigrants’ political attitudes.
Furthermore, whereas MRP is widely acknowledged as the “gold standard” for estimating
public opinion in small areas, it is rarely applied outside of the US due to the lack of detailed
Census data [92]. This paper applies the MRP method by using several different ways to
synthesize detailed Census data. Given that the size of the immigrants’ sample in the survey
is much smaller than a sample of all residents, MRP is even more useful to estimate opinions
among immigrants.
3.2 Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Immigrants’ Political Attitudes
There is a small but growing literature exploring the impacts of politics in host countries
on immigrants’ political attitudes [117, 23, 75, 14, 131]. Immigrants have chances to expe-
1For the notable exceptions, see [75], and [131].
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rience new political institutions and culture in host countries, and these experiences shape
their attitudes toward the political system of host countries [38, 56].
Many studies focus on the impacts of migration experiences in advanced democracies on
the political attitudes of immigrants from emerging democracies [e.g. 117, 23, 56]. When
immigrants are from new democracies, they have higher chances to experience established
democratic institutions and cultures. Being exposed to democratic culture and institutions,
immigrants learn and adopt democratic values and become more supportive of the Western
democracy [38, 56]. While it is hard to rule out the possibility that individuals who are
already favorable of Western democracies are more likely to migrate to Western Europe, a
number of studies find that individuals with migration experiences in Western democracies
are more supportive of democratic political system [14].
Yet, immigrants’ experiences with politics in Western democracies are not always posi-
tive. Political environments in host countries can be discriminatory and hostile against im-
migrants, even in advanced democracies. And this can create backlashes from immigrants.
Experiences of discriminatory and hostile actions can affect immigrants’ opinion toward the
host countries in general [40, 142, 75]. When anti-immigration sentiment is on the rise, im-
migrants likely experience various forms of hostilities. Exposure to negative messages about
immigrants or negative posts about their country of origins, posted in media or even coming
up in casual conversations with native citizens can turn immigrants to be less attached to
host countries and become more nationalistic to their home countries [142, 40]. Similarly,
political rhetoric that emphasizes the conventional identity of host countries also can re-
duce immigrants’ political support for the political system. When immigrants encounter
nationalistic rhetoric from political elites, immigrants likely feel threatened, excluded from
the political process, and end up considering host countries’ political system as ”not for
them” [131]. These anti-immigrant rhetorics reflect and, at the same time, reproduce the
anti-immigrant sentiment [e.g. 69, 71]. As anti-immigrant sentiment grows in host countries,
immigrants are more likely to be exposed to a more hostile and discriminatory social climate,
which leads immigrants to have negative experiences with host countries’ politics.
This paper is not the first attempt to explore the impacts of the radical right-wing parties
on immigrants’ political attitudes. By regressing immigrants’ attitudes on the vote share of
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far-right parties at the country level, [75] shows that the vote share of far-right parties is
negatively correlated with immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy. Building on the previous
work, this paper examines the impacts of far-right parties on immigrants’ attitudes toward
democracy and the political system in host countries at the regional level.
While the electoral success of radical right-wing parties can affect immigrants’ expe-
riences with democracies at the country level, its impact could vary depending on where
they live. The support for far-right parties and public opinion regarding immigrants widely
vary across regions, even within the same country [e.g. 27, 99]. For instance, in the recent
federal election in Germany (2017), Afd won 11.5 % of votes nationally, but its vote share
widely varies across regions. While Afd won the most votes in the Saxony region with a
vote share of 27 %, AfD gained only 7.8 % of the votes in Hamburg, being a fifth most
voted party. This wide variation across regions is not unique to Germany. In many Western
democracies, regional division in terms of support for right-wing extremism is more severe
than cross-country divisions [e.g. 99]. Even in the same country, immigrants who live in
areas with high popular support for far-right parties likely experience much more hostilities
and discrimination against themselves than immigrants in different regions. This leads to
the main hypothesis of the paper:
H1: Immigrants feel less satisfied with democracy in host countries when they live in a region
where the support for far-right parties is high.
One may speculate that immigrants’ experiences with discrimination or hostilities may
not necessarily affect their political attitudes toward the political system itself. However, for
the last decade, immigration has become a salient political issue, and immigration-related
issues have become the center of political debates in many Western democracies [35]. Fur-
thermore, far-right parties with strong anti-immigrant policy agendas have been growing
and well-integrated into mainstream politics, even affecting other parties’ policy positions
[134, 52]. The inclusion of radical right-wing in the democratic political institution could
lead immigrants to become even dissatisfied toward the political system of the host countries.
Thus, I expect that immigrants in advanced democracies are less supportive of democratic
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norms and practices when regions they live in have a high level of support for far-right parties
and anti-immigration sentiment.
Lastly, the rise of radical right-wing parties may have varying effects on immigrants’
attitudes by their country of origin. Immigrants from other EU countries differ from immi-
grants from outside of the EU in several ways. First, individuals from other EU countries
are more likely to be familiar with the political process of the host countries compared to
immigrants from non-EU countries. Also, EU citizens have unique legal status that grants
relatively more extensive rights, including political rights, compared to non-EU immigrants.
For instance, EU citizens residing in other EU member states have unrestricted voting rights
in local elections [8]. This unique status of EU citizens in other EU member states can
lead them to have different attitudes toward the political system of host countries from
immigrants from non-EU countries.
Considering the higher level of expectation and knowledge of the political system of
the host countries, immigrants from other EU countries can be more critical regarding the
performance of host countries’ political systems. However, at the same time, relatively more
extensive political and legal rights may lead EU citizens to be more supportive of the political
system than other immigrants. Also, their legal status can make them feel less threatened
by the rise of radical right-wing parties compared to non-EU immigrants. Furthermore,
other EU countries are culturally more similar to the host country relative to other non-EU
countries. Given that far-right parties’ electoral successes greatly rely on popular grievances
regarding cultural differences [e.g. 52, 112], immigrants from less similar cultural backgrounds
might feel more threatened by the popularity of far-right parties than immigrants from other
EU countries.
In sum, there are reasons to believe both hypotheses that the impacts of success of far-
right parties on immigrants’ political attitudes may be bigger or smaller when immigrants
are from other EU countries. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H2: The impacts of the support for far-right parties on immigrants’ attitudes are lower when
they are from other EU member countries.
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3.3 Research Design
I use an individual-level survey of immigrants, along with Bayesian multilevel regression
and post-stratification, to estimate immigrants’ political attitudes at the sub-national level.
I use the individual-level survey data of immigrants who reside in nine Western European
countries, collected as a part of the European Social Survey (ESS). To identify immigrants
from a sample, I rely on questions asking respondents’ country of birth and country of
citizenship. Using this survey data combined with the electoral outcomes data at the sub-
national level, I investigate how the rise of radical right-wings affects immigrants’ political
attitudes, especially toward democracy.
3.3.1 Data
3.3.1.1 Far-Right Parties in Europe
To classify radical right-wing parties in Western Europe, I rely on two sources of data:
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and Chaple Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data. Both
datasets are used widely to classify the party family in Europe based on parties’ manifesto
and surveys on experts of each country, respectively. I collect the vote share of far-right
parties in the national elections at the regional level that corresponds to the regional level
reported in the survey data (NUTS 1-2). ESS identifies respondents’ geographical location
at the NUTS 2 level for most countries in the sample.2
3.3.1.2 Individual-level Survey for Immigrants
It is challenging to find survey data with a representative sample of immigrants. There
are few surveys that target immigrants as the main sample and also ask them political
questions. One solution is to use nationally representative surveys in host countries that
target all the households regardless of respondents’ citizenship and country of birth [75, 131,
2Germany and UK are the exceptions. They only report respondents’ location at the NUTS 1 level, and
vote share of far-right parties are collected at the NUTS 1 level accordingly.
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e.g.]. For instance, European Social Survey targets to sample “All persons aged 15 and over
resident within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship
or language.” As a result, ESS includes immigrants in their sample as seen in the table 8.
To capture a sample of immigrants who live in Western European countries, I use ESS
in nine Western European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Denmark) from wave 1 to 8, which covers from 2002 to 2016
biannually. ESS asks respondents if they are born in the country of their current residence,
their citizenship status, and the country of their origin. Using these questions, I identify
individuals who are born in foreign countries. Table 8 reports the distribution of respon-
dents’ country of birth from the most recent wave of ESS. The proportion of foreign-born
individuals in the ESS sample ranges from 4 to 10 %.
ESS asks a diverse set of questions regarding politics and democracy, as well as demo-
graphic questions. To measure immigrants’ attitudes toward democracy, I use the following
question: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in this [country]?” Responses
are coded on a 0 to t10 point scale, with ten being the most satisfied with democracy in
the country. While there are some critics, this question has been widely used and acknowl-
edged as a measure of individuals’ attitudes toward the political system [e.g. 5, 75].3. In
addition, I explore immigrants’ satisfaction with host countries’ government, trust in demo-
cratic institutions such as parliament 4. I also measure the public opinion of natives on the
same variables at the sub-national level using the ESS data, along with the MRP methods.
Political attitudes of other people could affect an individual’s political opinions (e.g. Mutz,
1998).
Lastly, I estimate the natives’ attitudes toward immigrants using the three different ques-
tions in ESS regarding the immigrants’ impacts on the national economy, culture, and society
in general.5 All three questions are coded in 0 to 10 scale where 10 is more positive, and
3To see the discussion regarding the distinction between measuring satisfaction with democratic perfor-
mance and satisfaction with democracy per se, see [98]
4All indicators are on 11 point scale (0 to 10), 0 being the lowest level of satisfaction or trust, and
10 being the highest level of satisfaction or trust. Following are the actual questions used in the survey.
“How satisfied are you with the way government works in this [country]?”, “How much do you trust in
parliament/politicians of this [country]?”
5“Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from
other countries?”, “Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people
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Table 7: Far-Right Parties in Western Europe
Country (National) Election Year Far-Right Party
Austria 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013 Freedom Party of Austria
Belgium 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
Flemish Interest (Flemish Region)
National Front (French Region)
Germany 2013 Alternative for Germany
Denmark 2007, 2011, 2016 Denmark Danish People’s Party
Finland 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 True Finns
France 2002, 2007, 2012 National Front
Netherlands 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 Party for Freedom
Sweden 2010, 2014 Sweden Democrats
UK 2005, 2010, 2015 United Kingdom Independence Party
Note: Electoral outcomes of Belgium is measured separately in Flemish region and French speaking regions.
Table 8: Proportion of Foreign-born Sample (ESS )
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0 is more negative towards immigrants. This more directly measures the anti-immigration
sentiment in each region and discrimination that immigrants likely encounter in their daily
lives.
3.3.2 Estimating Immigrants’ Opinion with MRP
3.3.2.1 Why Do We Need MRP?
One challenge of using the nationally representative survey to measure the immigrants’
attitude is that the sample size of foreign-born individuals is often too small. When it comes
to measuring immigrants’ attitudes at the sub-national level, the problem is more severe
since the number of foreign-born individuals in each region is even smaller.
Foreign-born sample Foreign-born, non-citizen sample
Figure 2: Sample Size of Immigrants in Survey (ESS)
Figure 2 shows the size of the foreign-born sample of the survey at the regional (NUTS
1/2) level of interest (wave 8). It shows that most regions have less than twenty foreign-born
respondents in each region. Furthermore, the number of foreign-born individuals who are not
coming to live here from other countries?”, “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people
coming to live here from other countries?”
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the citizen of host countries are even smaller. Second figure shows that majority of regions
have less than ten individuals who are foreign-born, non-citizen in each region.
This raises a methodological challenge for measuring immigrants’ attitudes at the sub-
national level. Although the survey is nationally representative, the sample is often non-
representative at the regional level, which creates challenges for researchers to estimate
public opinion at the sub-national level [48]. This problem is even more severe when it
comes to estimating the attitudes of immigrants at the sub-national level. The size of the
foreign-born sample in each region is often too small to represent or estimate a public opinion
of immigrants at the regional level. In extreme cases, there is only one observation that is
foreign-born in a particular region. This raises the question of how reliable or accurate the
regional mean of this sample would be. The limited size of the sample easily leads to a
biased, unreliable estimate of public opinion at the sub-national level.
I address these issues by applying multilevel regression and post-stratification, or MRP.
Since the seminal paper by [48], MRP has been widely used and validated by a number
of renowned studies as a technique to estimate public opinion at the regional level with
non-representative sample [116, 89, 90, 25].
MRP adjusts estimates from a non-representative sample by using additional informa-
tion regarding a true population (i.e. Census). MRP consists of two stages. First, we model
the outcome of interest, using a hierarchical regression model with individual-level survey
data, and produce the estimate of outcome (ŷ) by different combinations of individual char-
acteristics, and geographical locations. For instance, if we model the individuals’ attitudes
(y) with their age (grouped in five age-group), education level (six ), in five different regions,
we estimate the attitudes for every combination of these covariates, and have 150 estimates
(5 age-group × 6 education level × 5 regions) of y. Then, we improve the accuracy of these
estimates of outcomes by weighting the estimate with the ratio of each combination in actual
population using Census data.
In sum, MRP is a method to correct the potential bias from a non-representative sample
in small areas by using population information. MRP is now widely acknowledged as a “gold
standard” in terms of estimating public opinion at the sub-national level [127]. This method
is especially useful for measuring the political attitudes of immigrants using the survey at
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the sub-national level since the number of observations of foreign-born samples is even more
sparse compared to a sample of natives in the same region.
3.3.2.2 Census Data, and Synthesizing the Joint Distribution
For the post-stratification, detailed census data is a crucial requirement. Census data
needs to correspond to each demographic feature and geographical location that is used in
the individual-level model to predict the outcome. In other words, the joint distribution of
every variable in the estimation model is necessary to conduct MRP. For instance, continuing
the previous example, if an individual-level model includes the age group (5), and education
level (6), in five different geographical locations, the census data needs to include the number
of population in every 150 different categories (5× 6× 5).
What is challenging is that such detailed census data is often not available outside of
the US [92]. This prevents researchers from estimating public opinion using MRP, which is
widely acknowledged as a “gold standard” for estimating public opinion in small areas [127].
Many Western European countries are no exception. Many Western European countries do
not provide the full joint distribution of important demographic features such as the level of
education and age group. Among nine Western European countries in the sample, only three
countries provide a complete joint distribution of important demographic features (UK, Aus-
tria, Finland) for limited years, and five other countries only provide marginal distribution
for selected demographic features (Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark) for every
year. Especially, these countries do not provide joint distribution between the important
demographics variables (i.e. gender, age, education) and the country of origin. This is more
problematic since our population of interest is foreign-born immigrants. Without the joint
distribution, it is not possible to post stratify the estimates at the sub-national level.
In order to address this issue, I synthesized joint distribution using the only marginal
distribution of each variable from Census data. There are a few methods available to simulate
the joint distribution only with the marginal distribution of variables. First widely used
method is the raking or iterative proportional fitting procedure (ipfp) [47, 136]. Raking is a
method to apply a proportional adjustment to the sample weights to an initial contingency
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table until the adjusted weights being equal to the known marginal distributions for every
dimension. Raking has been widely used to estimate the small area estimation.
Another approach is to generate synthetic (adjusted) joint distribution using the marginal
distribution of census data and joint distributions in survey data [92]. This strategy generates
the synthetic joint distribution by exploiting the information from the survey data. This
method relies on an assumption that correlation between variables is representative and the
same across the different sub-national levels.
Whereas raking is a widely used standard process in survey research, [? ] find that
post-stratification with synthetic joint distribution outperforms post-ratification with raking
in their sample. The synthetic joint distribution approach takes into account the additional
information about the correlation between variables from the survey data while raking does
not. In addition, the raking outcomes can be sensitive to the initial contingency table [136].
Lastly, it is possible to combine two approaches: conducting raking, using the correlation
between variables from the survey data as an initial contingency table. This approach allows
us to exploit the information from the survey data as well as accounting for the possibilities
that correlation structure between variables can differ across the different sub-national levels.
In order to select and validate the method for synthesizing the joint distribution, I compare
the synthesized joint distribution and true joint distribution that is available. As mentioned
earlier, UK provides a full joint distribution across the following demographics in the year
2011 at the regional (NUTS 1) level: age (6), gender (2), level of education (3), citizenship
status (2), place of birth (3). This leads to 216 joint categories of population s (6 × 2 ×
3× 2× 3) per each region. I synthesized joint distribution using marginal distribution data
and compare the synthesized number of populations per category, in each region to the true
population.
Figure 3 shows the comparison between synthesized population size from three different
methods (raking, adjust synthesized distribution, raking with synthesized adjust distribu-
tion) and true population. The correlation between the synthesizing methods and the true
population is 0.710, 0.760, 0.854 respectively. The correlation with the true population is the
highest between the synthesized adjust joint distribution method and the true population.
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Figure 3: Comparing Performance of Synthesizing Methods
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3.3.2.3 Individual-Level Model Estimation
In order to investigate the impacts of political environments of host countries on im-
migrants’ political attitudes at the sub-national level, first, I estimate the political opinion
of immigrants using multilevel regression. Then, I post-stratify this estimate to gain more
accurate estimate of public opinion at the sub-national (NUTS 2) level. Lastly, using this
regional estimate, I investigate the relationship between the vote share of far-right parties in
each region, and the attitudes of immigrants at the regional level (NUTS 2).
I use the multilevel (linear) model with random effects varying across NUTS 2 regions.
Below is the model to estimate the political attitudes of immigrants, including their satisfac-
tion with democracy. To predict individuals’ political attitudes, I use demographic features
of individuals such as gender, age, level of education, citizenship status, and country of origin
(other EU countries or not).
These demographic features are some of the strongest predictors of political opinions.
For immigrants, the status of citizenship and country of origin may play a crucial role in
shaping their political attitudes [75].
Immigrants’ countries of origin are coded as binary: born in other EU countries or born
outside the EU. As discussed in the previous section, the distinction between EU citizens and
others could be a significant predictor for individuals’ political attitudes since individuals
from other EU members differ from other immigrants in several ways. Especially in EU
member countries, EU citizens have different legal status and political rights from other
foreign-born individuals. These characteristics of EU countries can lead individuals to have
different baseline attitudes toward the political system of host countries. They can either be
more supportive of the political system of host countries or be more critical of the system
due to their higher expectations [75].
Citizenship status is also potentially a strong predictor of individuals’ political atti-
tudes. Whereas far-right extremism could impact all of the immigrants’ political attitudes
by making them feel threatened and excluded [131], the size of impacts could differ a lot by
citizenship status since citizenship provides formal protection for immigrants [76, 75]. Citi-
zenship can turn individuals to be more incorporated and involved in politics by providing
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legal protection and rights to participate [91]. Furthermore, it is also plausible immigrants
who feel more attached and supportive of host countries’ political system likely apply for
citizenship.
There are other predictors for individuals’ political attitudes, such as political ideology.
However, to use post-stratification to measure the sub-national level attitudes, the individual
level model should only include variables available in Census.
Yi ∼ Normal(µi, σ2)
µi = β0+β














I model gender, country of origin (EU), and citizenship status as regression coefficients
without multilevel structure embedded given that they are binary variables, following a
similar modeling strategy with [116]. For varying coefficients, I assign normal distribution
with mean being 0, and standard deviations (σage, σedu, σnuts, σyearσcountry) estimated from
data using weakly informative prior (σ ∼ HalfNormal(0, 5)). Age is coded in 5 different
groups,6 and education is coded as 6 point scale, where 1 being less than primary education,
and 6 being higher than master’s degree.
Figure 4 shows demographic coefficients in the regression of the level of satisfaction with
democracy with 50 and 95 % intervals.7 As seen in the figure, most of the age and education
features have relatively little predictive power except the youngest age group (15-24).8 On the
other hand, the status of citizenship and country of birth have a relatively strong predictor of
individuals’ satisfaction with democracy. When individuals have citizenship or were born in
other EU countries, individuals report lower satisfaction with how democracy works in host
countries. This relationship does not provide evidence for whether or how the vote share of
far-right parties affects EU citizens differently from other immigrants. Yet, it shows that EU
citizens may have higher expectations for the political system of host countries and tend to
be more critical when it comes to evaluating the performance of the political system, which
is consistent with some of the previous findings [e.g. 75].
6add age group definition here
7Intervals reported here is Bayesian probability intervals or credible interval. 95 % interval indicates two
values that contain 95% of the posterior probability.
8Multilevel model tends to shrink coefficient to zero. For more detail, see [48].
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Figure 4: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients (Satisfaction with Democracy)
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Using this individual-level model, I estimate the regional level opinion using the post-
stratification with synthesized joint distribution from Census. As mentioned earlier, some of
the countries in the sample do not provide a full joint distribution of variables in the model.
3.4 Far-right Party Vote Share and Immigrants’ Attitudes
I investigate how the vote share of far-right parties influences the immigrants’ political
attitudes, using the estimate of their attitudes at the sub-national level (NUTS 2). Table
13 reports the regression of immigrants’ political attitudes on far-right vote share at the
regional level (NUTS 2). Immigrants’ political attitudes at the regional level are estimated
using the MRP with synthesized joint distribution from the previous section.
The direction of coefficients are as expected from H1: the higher the vote share of
radical right-wing parties, the lower immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy and government
is. Also, immigrants’ trust in the political institution of the host countries is correlated
negatively with the vote share of far-right parties in the region. Also, I included the level of
satisfaction with democracy, government, and trust in parliament among natives as a control
(estimated via MRP), which is correlated positively with immigrants’ attitudes.
In addition, I also explore the relationship between natives’ attitudes toward immigrants
with immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy in host countries. To estimate natives’ atti-
tudes toward immigrants, I use three different survey questions regarding immigrants asking
immigrants’ influence on host countries, in the economic, cultural, and social aspects.9 All
three variables are coded in 0 to 10 scale where 10 being most pro-immigrant, and 0 being
anti-immigrant. Natives’ attitudes toward immigrants are also estimated at the regional
level (NUTS 2) using MRP with the synthesized joint distribution.
Table 10 shows the relationship between three different measures of natives’ attitudes
toward immigrants, and immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy in host countries. when
9Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from
other countries?, Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people
coming to live here from other countries?, Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people
coming to live here from other countries?
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Table 9: Radical Right-wing Parties and Immigrants’ Attitudes
Dependent variable:
Satisfied w Satisfied w Trust in
Democracy Government Parliament
FR Vote.Share −0.191∗∗ −0.174∗∗ −0.189∗
(0.085) (0.077) (0.100)
Satisfied w Democracy 0.699∗∗∗
(Native) (0.040)
Satisfied w Government 0.264∗∗
(Native) (0.108)
Trust in Parliament 0.185∗
(Native) (0.104)
Pop.Density 0.00003 −0.00002 0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Foreign-born Share 0.562∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗
(0.208) (0.188) (0.230)
Region Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Observations 338 338 338
Akaike Inf. Crit. −682.798 −2,075.983 −1,767.894
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −656.036 −2,035.338 −1,727.248
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Satisfied w Democracy 0.660∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(Native) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Pop.Density −0.00002 −0.00003 −0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Foreign-born Share 0.122 0.167 0.163
(0.118) (0.132) (0.132)
Region Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Observations 356 356 356
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,094.095 −1,041.529 −1,042.587
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −1,063.096 −1,010.529 −1,011.588
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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public opinion (among natives) toward immigrants is more favorable, immigrants’ satisfaction
with the political system is higher at the regional level.
Lastly, I explore how the success of radical right-wing parties influences immigrants’
political attitudes differently depending on whether they are from other EU member coun-
tries or not (H2). To examine this conditional effect, I estimate the political attitudes of
immigrants from EU countries and the attitudes of immigrants from non-EU countries sep-
arately, using the same individual-level model along with the MRP method. 10 In other
words, instead of measuring immigrants’ opinion at the regional level (as in table 13, and
10), I measure immigrants’ attitudes at the region-country of origin level. Then, I interact
the immigrants’ country of origin (EU vs. Non-EU) with the regional vote share of radical
right-wing parties to examine this conditional effect by immigrants’ country of origin.
Table 11 shows the partial support for the H2 in that there are conditional effects of
radical right-wing parties’ vote share on immigrants’ attitudes by whether they are citizens of
other EU countries or not. First, across all three models, immigrants from non-EU countries
show a significantly higher level of baseline satisfaction with democracy, government, and
trust in parliament (Non-EU). In other words, immigrants from other EU member countries
have lower baseline satisfaction with the political system of the host countries. It is consistent
with the previous studies’ findings that individuals with higher expectations and better
knowledge of the political system of host countries could be more critical toward it [e.g. 75].
Figure ?? summarizes this pattern by showing how marginal effects of radical right-
wing parties’ vote share in the region influence immigrants’ attitudes differently by their
country of origin. Blue represents the immigrants from outside of the EU, and red represents
immigrants from other EU member countries. While immigrants from outside of the EU have
a higher baseline satisfaction with democracy than immigrants from other EU members, their
satisfaction with democracy decreases far more than immigrants from other EU countries
when far-right parties are successful. As the vote share of far-right parties increases, non-
EU immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy decreases while EU immigrants’ satisfaction
with democracy does not change at the statistically significant level. A similar pattern also
10Individual-level model used here is the identical model with the individual-level model used to measure
the immigrants’ attitudes from the previous section.
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Table 11: Conditional Effects by Immigrants’ Country of Origin (EU vs Non-EU)
Dependent variable:
Satisfied w Satisfied w Trust in
Democracy Government Parliament
FR Vote Share 0.081 −0.848∗∗∗ 0.249
(0.141) (0.238) (0.178)
Non EU 0.421∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.015)
FR Vote Share ×NonEU −0.442∗∗∗ −0.215 −0.459∗
(0.082) (0.140) (0.119)
Satisfied w Democracy 0.522∗∗∗
(Native) (0.012)
Satisfied w Government 0.538∗∗∗
(Native) (0.030)
Trust in Parliament 0.503∗∗∗
(Native) (0.036)
Pop.Density −0.0001∗∗ −0.00000 −0.0001
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00004)
Foreign-born Share 1.342∗∗∗ 0.682 1.347∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.524) (0.407)
Region Effect X X X
Year Effect X X X
Observations 623 623 623
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,104.593 −502.995 −761.455
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −1,060.248 −458.650 −717.110
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Satisfied w Democracy Satisfied w Government Trust in Parliament
Figure 5: Marginal Effects by Immigrants’ Country of Origin (EU vs Non-EU)
appears for immigrants’ level of trust in parliament. Although the impact size is relatively
small, the vote share of far-right parties affects immigrants’ level of trust in parliament more
negatively when they are from non-EU countries.
However, the size of impacts of far-right parties’ vote share on immigrants’ satisfaction
with democracy varies by immigrants’ country of origin (EU vs. Non-EU). The interaction
term between far-right parties’ vote share and immigrants’ country of origin (FR Vote Share×
Non-EU ) is negative and statistically significant. It means that far-right parties’ success af-
fects immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy more negatively when they came from outside
the EU.
3.5 Discussion
This paper examines the impacts of the electoral success of far-right parties on immi-
grants’ attitudes toward the political system in host countries at the sub-national level using
the multilevel regression with post-stratification. The findings of this paper suggest that the
higher support for far-right parties is, the lower immigrants’ satisfaction with democracy,
government performance, and trust in a political institution (parliament) in host countries.
These findings have important implications for the research on the political consequences
of right-wing extremism in Europe. First, the electoral success of far-right parties can hinder
the political integration of immigrants to host countries. With a growing number of foreign-
born population, the quality of governance and democracy in Western democracy depends
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at least partially on how successful they can incorporate newcomers.
Furthermore, the immigrants’ political attitudes likely have impacts on politics outside
of host countries. Many immigrants are connected or ultimately even return to their home
countries, and they play a significant role in transmitting and diffusing the political values
and ideas to their home countries [117, 56]. Given that many immigrants are from new, less
consolidated democracies, the impacts of right-wing extremism in Western democracies can
negatively affect democratic consolidation beyond their borders.
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4.0 Immigration, Party Competition, and Welfare State
4.1 Introduction
For the last decade, immigration has become one of the most salient political issues in
Western Europe. From Brexit to the rise of far-right parties all across Western Europe,
immigration has been the center of the electoral competition among European parties [35,
36, 32]. While a growing salience of immigration have drawn burgeoning scholarly attention,
most of the research has mainly focused on how immigration influences parties’ electoral
success or immigration policy itself [50, 13, 134, 24, 32]. Yet, the impact of the high salience
of immigration is not limited to immigration politics per se. Immigration can influence
parties’ policy position in other policy areas as well as immigration policy by changing the
structure of political cleavage [74, 112].
This paper examines how the growing salience of immigration influences parties’ welfare
policy positions. In particular, I build on the existing argument that immigration has become
a new political cleavage that cuts across the conventional left-right division in redistribution
policy [54, 6, 112].
The rise of a cross-cutting cleavage posits a challenge, especially for left-wing parties.
Conventionally, left-wing parties are committed to welfare expansion as well as liberal socio-
cultural values such as open migration policies [111, 54, 59]. Yet, a significant portion
of left-wing parties’ constituents is not supportive of liberal migration policies. Left-wing
parties depend on the electoral supports of two different types of constituents: working-
class voters who benefit the most from welfare expansion and highly-educated voters with
liberal socio-cultural values. Whereas highly educated, socially liberal voters support liberal
migration policies, working-class voters are often socially conservative and more likely to be
nativist [e.g. 57, 58]. The growing salience of immigration highlights such division within
left-wing constituents.
Given this, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties adjust their welfare
policy positions to maximize their vote. By maintaining their conventional policy positions
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on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant portion of their core con-
stituents. At the same time, however, adjusting only immigration policy positions may not
be enough to maintain electoral supports. For instance, if left-wing parties change their im-
migration policy to more conservative to accommodate their low-income constituents, they
may lose their socially liberal supporters [4, 55]. To compensate for this loss, left-wing parties
will need to adjust their other policy (welfare) to appeal to other voters.
Then, under which conditions do left-wing parties benefit from adopting more or less
conservative welfare policy positions? Left-wing parties’ policy position will depend on
the joint distribution of voters over these two cleavages. To generate specific expectations
of how and under which condition parties adjust their welfare policy positions, I apply
a classic formal model of [124]. Roemer’s model explains how parties’ optimal strategy
changes differently depending on whether parties compete in a single policy dimension versus
multi-dimensional policy space. Using religion as a cross-cutting cleavage to economic policy,
Roemer derives a condition where left-parties benefit by converging to conservative economic
policies.
Applying this model to immigration, I demonstrate a condition where left-wing parties
shift their welfare policy position. When immigration is highly salient, and voters with
median views on immigration are wealthier than average voters, left-wing parties have the
incentive to converge to right-wing parties’ welfare policy position. In other words, when
anti-immigrant voters have a lower level of income than average, the left-wing parties need
to change their welfare policy position to a more conservative direction.
Based on this implication of the model, I empirically test how the salience of immigration
and the joint distribution of voters’ preferences over welfare and immigration policy position
in ten Western European countries from 2000 to 2019 1. For the empirical test, I use
the Comparative Manifesto Data, along with a diverse set of individual-level survey data,
including the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer. I find that left-wing parties
converge to right-wing parties’ welfare policy position when immigration is salient. And
this tendency is much stronger when voters with median views on immigration are wealthier
average voters.
1Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK
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These findings contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, it shows how
growing anti-immigration sentiment and its salience can influence policies beyond immi-
gration policies, especially welfare policies. Welfare policies have more direct influences on
the daily lives of voters than immigration policies. Considering this, the impacts of the
politicization of immigration could be even broader than expected.
Second, this adds to the literature of globalization backlash and party politics. Given
that economic globalization induces (economic) winners and losers, it is crucial to provide
compensations for losers to prevent backlashes against globalization [63, 62, 96]. Left-wing
governments played a significant role in compensating economic losers by increasing social
expenditure more actively compared to right-wing governments [120]. The findings of this
paper suggest that a growing salience of immigration may hinder mainstream left-wing par-
ties’ ability to pursue welfare expansion. The lack of compensation can lead to nativist
backlash against globalization, including immigration itself.
4.2 Immigration as Cross-Cutting Cleavage
The rise of cultural cleavage is not a new phenomenon. The left-right division was
established originally around redistribution policies. Left-wing parties’ core constituents
were primarily working-class voters who benefit most from welfare expansion while right-
wing parties support free-market policies [e.g. 112]. Yet, since the mid-70s, cultural issues
such as ethnic minorities’ rights or environmental issues have become increasingly salient in
electoral competition [31, 74, 112]. The problem is that individuals’ preferences over these
cultural issues do not fall nicely into the conventional cleavage of left-right, but cut across
the existing cleavage over redistribution policies [6, 112].2
Immigration is one of the issues in the cultural dimension, whose salience has increased
dramatically over the last few years. Figure 6 demonstrates this trend. To measure the
2For notable exception, see [24] and [64]. They show that conventional ideological division between left
and right is still an important predictor of parties’ cultural policy positions. However, their analyses are
limited to the period until 2010, which is the time prior to the dramatic increase of the salience of immigration
issue in Western Europe.
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Figure 6: Salience of Immigration Issue Trend
salience of immigration issue, I rely on the Eurobarometer survey which includes a question
asking if respondents consider immigration as an important issue a country is facing. Salience
of immigration indicates the proportion of respondents who consider the immigration as an
important issue in ten Western European countries in our sample. The proportion of people
who consider immigration to be an important issue in their country increased from below
10 percent to 30 percent in the last two decades. Especially after the surge of refugee
inflows into Europe in the 2010s, the perceived salience of immigration has increased by a
big amount. This increase in the salience of immigration makes immigration an important
political cleavage that cuts across the conventional left-right dimensions.
Working-class voters’ interests do not align well with open migration policies. Low-
skilled, low-income voters feel more threatened by the inflows of foreigners both culturally
and economically.3, and that low-skilled, low-income voters are more likely to be nativist
3Immigration issue also has an economic aspect as well as a cultural aspect. Many scholars primarily
view immigration as an economic issue that aggravates labor market competition by introducing labor
forces [e.g. 101]. Especially in developed economies, an influx of low-skilled workers has been perceived
as an economic threat for domestic low-skilled and low-income workers. However, many studies find that
individuals’ attitudes toward immigrants are determined primarily by cultural values [57, 58]
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and have anti-immigration attitudes [e.g. 57, 58, 94].
The problem is that left-wing parties are committed to socio-culturally liberal policy
positions (e.g. open migration policy) as well as welfare expansions which represent the
interest of working-class voters at the same time [6, 59]. Left-wing parties nowadays depend
on a coalition of two different types of constituents: low-income working-class voters who
benefit from welfare expansions and highly educated voters with liberal socio-cultural values.
Immigration issues divide these two different types of left-wing parties’ core constituents into
two opposite directions. When the salience of immigration is low, this division is not crucial
enough to determine constituents’ votes. However, when immigration becomes a salient
issue for voters, this division within the constituents becomes challenging, particularly for
left-wing parties.
Figure 7: Distribution of Income by Immigration Attitudes
Figure 7 visualizes such division within parties’ constituents. Figure 7 shows the
distribution of income by immigration attitudes using the European Social Survey (ESS).
To classify respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants, I use following questions from ESS
“To what extent do you think [country] should allow people to come and live?” Answers are
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coded on a 4 point scale, 4 being most pro-immigrant (“Allow many to come”), and 1 being
the most anti-immigrant (“Allow none”). And income of respondents are measured using
a question “Which category describes your household’s total income after tax deductions?
(from 1 to 10th decile)”. Solid line is median income among people with each immigration
attitudes category.
This figure shows how the distribution of income varies by attitudes toward immigrants.
While people with strong anti-immigrant attitudes are disproportionately more from the low-
income population, those with pro-immigrant attitudes are more from the high-income seg-
ment of the population. The median income of the individuals with a strong anti-immigration
attitude is below the 50 percentile of the income distribution. On the other hand, the median
income of the string pro-immigration group is above the 60 percentile.
Considering the joint distribution of voters over immigration and the welfare issue, left-
wing parties need to adjust their policy positions in both immigration and the welfare issue
to maximize the electoral supports for them. Given the high salience of immigration issues,
left-wing parties likely lose a significant portion of their constituents regardless of their
immigration policy position since immigration is divisive within their constituents. Thus,
parties need to adjust their other policy (welfare) accordingly to appeal to a broader set of
voters to compensate for the loss of their conventional constituents.
Some argue that parties do not necessarily need to adjust their policy positions to max-
imize their votes. Instead, they can selectively emphasize the issue area that could broadly
appeal to their voters [125]. Many studies show that parties do manipulate the salience of
issues as a part of their electoral strategy [125, 20, 139]. Parties make their policy positions
more ambiguous for divisive issues while presenting their policy position on issues that have
more broad appeal to their constituents more clearly, and frequently [133].
However, these strategies are not always successful. Whereas parties can play a role as
an agenda-setter to some degree, the issue still requires to be salient to voters [16, 86]. When
an issue becomes salient due to the external shock or stays salient among voters regardless of
parties’ strategies, parties need to respond and even prioritize the issue [135, 85]. The salience
of immigration has increased rapidly over time in Western Europe, especially since the surge
of refugee inflow, and widely considered to be a salient issue for voters [36]. Accordingly,
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parties are expected to respond and present their policy positions on immigration issues
[134].
In sum, a growing salience of immigration poses a challenge for left-wing parties, and
they need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their votes. Given the division within
their constituents, what would be the optimal policy positions for left-wing parties can adopt
to maximize electoral support?
4.3 Party Competition in Multi-dimensional Policy Space
A high salience of immigration poses a challenge for left-wing parties by dividing their
constituents, and left-wing parties need to adjust their policy positions to maximize their
votes. But the optimal welfare and immigration policy position for left-wing parties depends
not only on the salience of immigration but also on the joint distribution of voters across
multi-dimensional policy space. Depending on the distribution of voters across both immi-
gration and welfare policies, the optimal policy position that left-wing parties can choose to
maximize their electoral success differs.
To generate the formal predictions of how and under which condition left-wing parties
choose more or less conservative welfare policy positions, I apply the classic model of [124].
(author?)’s model provides an optimal strategy for parties when they compete in multi-
dimensional policy space. In his original model, Roemer shows when religion being a cross-
cutting cleavage for redistribution policy, which welfare policy positions parties can take to
maximize their vote share. Roemer’s model provides a specific condition regarding the joint
distribution of voters across these two cleavages that parties can benefit from more or less
conservative welfare policies.
Immigration plays a similar role to religion in Roemer’s original model, which divides
the core constituents of left-wing parties into two different groups. Roemer’s model has
an important implication for Western European politics in that the growing salience of
immigration generates multi-dimensional policy spaces for party competition.
In the following section, I will explain Roemer’s model step by step and the implication
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of the model on the party competition in contemporary Western European politics.
4.3.1 Roemer’s Model of Electoral Competition in Multidimensional Space
4.3.1.1 Preliminary of Model
Roemer models a competition between two partisan parties (left, right). One of them is
the incumbent, and the other is the challenger.
The sequence of the game is as follows: First, a challenger party proposes a policy
position. After observing the policy of a challenger, the incumbent party chooses a policy
position. Both parties try to maximize the expected utility of their constituents. Formally,
the utility function of parties is defined as below.
ΠL(τL, τR) = π(τL, τR)u(τL; kL, aL) + (1− π(τL, τR))u(τR; kL, aL)
ΠR(τL, τR) = π(τL, τR)u(τL; kR, aR) + (1− π(τL, τR))u(τR; kR, aR)
τi is the policy of of each party, and π(τL, τR) is the probability of left-wing party to win
given policies (τL, τR). u(τL; kL, aL) refers to utility of the voter who has a preference for
immigration policy(k), and welfare policy(a) from the policy outcome τL. It reflects that
parties do not always converge on the median voters’ policy position even under a majoritar-
ian electoral system with only two mainstream parties. This premise induces an important
difference between the Downsian model and Roemer’s model. Roemer’s model generates
divergent policy positions between left-wing and right-wing parties at a single dimension,
whereas the Downsian model predicts convergence to the median voter’s position.
4.3.1.2 Divergence at a Uni-dimensional Policy Space
At a single dimension, voters and parties only care about the welfare policy. Parties
choose rate of proportional tax t, which is defined between 0, and 1 (t ∈ (0, 1)). Citizens’
utility is determined based on a tax rate and their wealth. Particularly, citizen’s utility
function includes their asset after taxation and their benefit from welfare expense from the
tax revenue. Formally, citizens’ utility function is determined as follow:
u(t;w) = (1− t)w + tµ = w + t(µ− w)
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where w refers to wealth of citizens, g(w) is a distribution of wealth (w), and µ refers to a
mean of g. (1− t)w is the citizen’s wealth after tax. Welfare from tax can be represented as




When we rewrite the function as w + t(µ − w), it shows that citizens who have less
wealth (w) than average (µ) would prefer a higher tax rate, while citizens who are wealthier
than average would prefer lower tax rate. In other words, in a single-dimensional space, the
distribution of wealth is a dominant determinant of parties’ policy positions. Whether the
fraction of voters who are poorer than average is larger than half of the voters becomes a




G(w) is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of income distribution (g(w)). Roemer
introduces the stochastic factor s, a random variable that determines the turnout of voters,
and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. gs(w) refers to the distributions of wealth of voters (who
turn out in election), and Gs(w) is a CDF of gs(w). Gs(µ) >
1
2
means that the fraction of
voters who are poorer than average are more than half.
Additionally, Roemer assumes thatGs(µ) is decreasing in s. This reflects that the turnout
rate is not homogeneous across the level of income. Here, s∗ is defined as a state s where
the fraction of voters who poorer than average are half of the voters. Based on assumption
Gs(µ) is decreasing function of s, s
∗ is the probability of winning for left-wing parties that
suggests a lower tax rate.
In sum, at a uni-dimensional policy space, each party choose distinct policy position
from each other to maximize their constituents’ welfare given fixed portion of their own
constituents.
4.3.1.3 Convergence at the Two Dimensional Policy Space
When it comes to two-dimensional space, parties’ policy positions can diverge under
certain conditions. In his original model, Roemer uses a religion as a second dimension that
cuts across the redistribution dimension. In this paper, I use immigration as the second
dimension that cuts across the welfare issue dimension.
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The utility function of citizens in the two-dimensional spaces is defined as below:
v(t, z;w, a) = (1− t)w + tµ− α
2
(z − a)2
where w wealth, view on immigration policy a. The first two terms are the same with the
utility function at a single dimension. And the third term reflects the utility of citizens with a
view on immigration (a) over the immigration policy position z. α reflects the salience of the
immigration dimension. Given this utility function of citizens, we can derive the conditions
when voters prefer τL(tL, zL) to τR(tR, zR).
z̄ + 4t(w−µ)
α4z > a if 4z > 0
where z = zR − zL, z̄ = (zL+zR)2 t = tR − tL,
In the previous section, the cut-point between supporters for the left and right-wing parties
was simply the mean of wealth (µ). However, in a two-dimensional space, the cut-point
between the left and right-wing supporters should be determined based on the joint distri-
bution of the two dimensions. z̄+ 4t(w−µ)
α4z is a function of parties’ policy decision making (t;
z). The relative distance between the parties’ policy position in each policy area and the size
of the salience factor (α) determines the cut-point between the left-wing party supporters
and right-wing party supporters.
Roemer assumes the citizens’ joint distribution over two dimensions h(w, a) = g(w)r(a, w).
g(w) is a distribution of wealth, and distribution of immigrant attitudes(a) at given w. Con-
sistent with the unidimensional model, Roemer defines the stochastic factor s that determines
the voter turnout. hs(w, a) is a joint distribution of voters’ wealth and immigrant attitudes
at state s. Φ(z, s) being a cumulative distribution function for immigrant attitudes in state
s. Formally, Φ(z, s) =
∫ ∫ z
−∞ gs(w)r(a, w)dadw. Roemer assumes that Φ(z, s) is strictly
decreasing in s. This extends the assumption at a single dimension that turn out of voters
are not homogeneous across voters.
When s is high, turn out of rich, anti-immigrant voter turn out more than others. And




−∞ gs∗(w)r(a, w)dadw =
1
2
s∗ is a state where fraction of voters for both parties are the same. Since Φ(z, s) is a
decreasing function of s, and s ∈ (0, 1), s∗ refers to a probability of left wing party winning
at the equilibrium.
4.3.1.4 Equilibria at the Two Dimensional Spaces
In the two-dimensional space, Roemer shows that there is a case where the left-wing
party’s welfare policy converges to the right. More specifically, it shows when immigration
being very salient, how parties change their welfare policy positions, and under which condi-
tion the left-wing parties’ welfare party position converges to the right-wing parties’ welfare
policy.
Assuming immigration being sufficiently salient (α → ∞), zL(∞) and zR(∞) represent
left and right-wing party’s immigration policy position when immigration is highly salient.
Theorem. When immigration issue becomes very salient, every equilibrium should include
tL = 0 when the following condition is held:
µ̄− µ > (µ− wL)∆z(∞)
2(zL(∞)− aL)
Here, µ̄ refers to the mean wealth of the voters with median religious position (z̄(∞) 4
while µ refers to the mean of wealth. On the right-hand side, we can see the ∆z(∞ in a
denominator, which refers to the difference between left and right-wing parties’ immigration
policy when immigration is highly salient. When immigration being salient enough, parties’
policy position on immigration is approximately the same as the uni-dimensional game of
immigration. Therefore, both left-wing and right-wing parties converge on median voters’
immigration policy position (∆z(∞) = 0). Thus, µ̄ should be equal to the median wealth of
voters who have the median religious view in the state s∗. Therefore, the theorem implies
that when voters who have a median view on immigration are wealthier than the average






right-wing party’s tax(welfare) policy position.
The condition that voters who have a median view on immigration are wealthier than the 
average (µ̄ − µ > 0) reflects a condition where immigration becomes a cross-cutting cleavage 
to the welfare issue. A scenario where voters with the median view on immigration are from a 
higher income group (µ̄ − µ > 0) means that voters with strongly anti-immigration views are 
more from the low-income segment of the population. On the other hand, a case where voters 
with median immigration views have lower income than the average (µ̄ − µ < 0) is when 
voters with strong anti-immigration attitudes are disproportionately more from the high-
income bracket. In other words, this condition is a condition where immigration is being a 
cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue.
Table 12 summarizes the implication of the model in two-by-two table. According to the 
model, when the salience of immigration is relatively low, left and right-wing parties diverge 
in their welfare policy position regardless of the joint distribution of voters’ preferences. Yet, 
when immigration becomes highly salient, parties converge to the right or left wing’s welfare 
policy position depending on the joint distribution of voters. Especially when anti-immigrant 
voters are disproportionately more from the low-income group (µ̄ − µ > 0), and immigration 
becomes a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue, left-wing parties tend to converge to a 
more conservative welfare policy position.
4.4 Research Design
Based on this model’s implication, I empirically test how the salience of immigration 
issue, and joint distribution of voters’ preference over welfare and immigration policy affect 
the parties’ welfare policy position.
First, to test the model’s prediction I estimate the variants of the following model:
Policy Gapc,i,i′ ,t = β0 + β1Saliencec,t + β2Conditionc,t + β3Saliencec,t × Conditionc,t + Zc,tγ
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where c, i, t index country, party, and election.
Dependent variable Policy Gapc,i,i′ ,t is the difference between welfare policy position of 
left-wing party (i) and right-wing party (i′ ) in country c at election-year t. Saliencec,t is the 
salience of immigration in country c at election-year t. Lastly, Conditionc,t refers to if voters 
who have median view on immigration issue is wealthier than average voters (µ̄ − µ > 0). In 
other words, this is a condition where voters with low income are more likely to have anti-
immigrant attitudes, which makes immigration a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue. 
According to the Roemer’s model, difference between parties’ policy position should decrease 
when immigration is salient, and at the same time, a voter with median immigration attitudes 
is wealthier than average voters (β3 < 0). Lastly, Zc,t refers to a vector of covariates that could 
affect the parties’ welfare policy positions, salience of immigration, and the distribution of 
voters’ preferences at the same time. As covariates, I include the level of annual immigration 
inflows, and the indicator for income inequality in each country (Gini coefficient). Lastly, I 
add the share of import per GDP. Economic globalization can have more direct impacts on 
parties’ welfare policy positions either by limiting the governments’ autonomy on economic 
policies [65, 60] or by posing fiscal pressure [20]. To account such potential direct impacts of 
economic globalization on parties’ welfare policy positions, I include the share of import in 
GDP.
4.4.1 Data Sources
First, to clarify the parties’ conventional ideological position, I use Comparative Man-
ifesto Project (CMP) data, which is one of the most widely used data to identify party families 
[e.g. 88]. CMP classifies parties into twelve different categories. Whereas CMP’s classification 
includes niche parties (i.e. ecological parties), this paper’s theory focuses on the mainstream 
left and right-wing parties. Accordingly, I use parties that are classified as (center) left or 
right-wing parties.5
To measure to what extent parties converge on a welfare policy position, I also rely   
     5“Socialist or other left parties”, “Social democratic parties (center-left)”, “Christian democratic parties”, 
“Conservative parties”
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on CMP data. CMP provides each party’s position on diverse policy areas based on their
manifesto published in each election. Particularly, CMP has a variable regarding each party’s
favorable mentions toward welfare state expansion (i.e. expansion of social security schemes,
such as health care, pensions, social housing). Using this measure, I estimate the differences
between left-wing and right-wing parties’ welfare policy positions.
To measure the salience of immigration issue (Saliencec,t), median voters’ attitudes on
immigration, and their income level (Conditionc,t), I utilize the (nationally representative)
individual-level survey data. First, to measure the salience of immigration, I use the Euro-
barometer survey data. Eurobarometer asks if respondents consider immigration as a salient
issue. Eurobarometer is especially useful to measure the salience of immigration issue since
it asks the same question every year since 2001 in all countries in the sample, which allows
us to compare the level of salience across time and countries. While there are other sur-
veys asking the salient issue in the country, they either have limited coverage of time and
countries, or they have inconsistent questions and answers across countries.6
I rely on the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure the median voters’ attitudes
toward immigrants and their income level. ESS is widely used in many works to estimate
the public attitudes toward immigrants in Europe. ESS has a series of questions asking
respondents’ attitudes toward immigration. For the analysis, I use a widely used question
that asks to what degrees respondents agree with open migration policies 7
4.5 Results
Table 13 reports the results of regression analysis of gap between welfare policy positions
of left and right-wing parties on salience of immigration, and joint distribution of voters’
preferences.
Across all models, I use a hierarchical linear model with country and year random inter-
6For instance, while Comparative Studies of Electoral System (CSES) data has bigger sample size on
average compared to Eurobarometer, they ask respondents about the most salient issue in an election only
in wave 2, and 3
7“How many immigrants do you think [country] should allow?” Answers are coded on 4 point scale,
where 4 “being allow as many as possible”, 1 being “allow none.”
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cept to account for variations across countries and time. Model (1) shows that without any
other covariates, the salience of immigration is negatively correlated with a policy gap be-
tween left and right-wing parties: as the salience of immigration increases, left and right-wing
parties tend to converge on their welfare policy positions.
Through model (2) to model (4) test the implication of Roemer’s model more directly
using the interaction between the salience of immigration and Conditionc,t, which refers to if
voters who have a median view on immigration is wealthier than average voters (µ̄−µ > 0).
Substantively, this condition refers to a case where low-income voters are disproportionately
more anti-immigrant, which makes immigration a cross-cutting cleavage to the welfare issue.
According to the model of Roemer, when voters who have a median view on immigration
are wealthier than average voters (µ̄− µ > 0), and salience of immigration is high, left-wing
parties’ welfare policy position converges to right-wing parties’ policy position. Throughout
the model (2) to (4), the direction of coefficients are as expected: When a voter who has
a median view on immigration is wealthier than average voters, left-wing parties tend to
converge more to right-wing parties’ welfare policy position as the salience of immigration
grows. This relationship is significant when controlling the various covariates such as inflows
of immigrants, economic inequality (Gini Coefficient), and economic globalization (Import
in GDP (%)).
Figure 8 shows this conditional effect of the salience of immigration by the joint distri-
bution of voters. Left panel shows the marginal effect of salience of immigration on welfare
policy position gap between left and right-wing parties when voters with median immigra-
tion view has lower income than average (µ̄−µ < 0). Right panel shows the marginal effect
when voters with median immigration view has higher income than average voter’s income
(µ̄− µ > 0).
The right side panel of the figure shows the marginal effect of the salience of immigration
on welfare policy position when voters who have a median view on immigration have a
higher level of income than average voters (µ̄− µ > 0). As the model predicts, when voters
with a strong anti-immigration view are from the low-income class (µ̄ − µ > 0), left-wing
parties tend to converge more to right-wing parties’ welfare policy position as the salience
of immigration.
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Table 12: Implication of Model (Summary)
Salience of Immigration \Condition
Condition = 0
(µ̄− µ < 0)
Condition = 1












Table 13: Convergence of Welfare Policy Position
Dependent variable:
Difference between Welfare Policy Position (L-R)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salience −0.021∗∗ 0.0425∗ 0.049∗ 0.029
(0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030)
Condition 1.390∗∗ 1.282∗∗ 1.712∗∗
(0.568) (0.595) (0.704)
Salience × −0.096∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
Condition (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Immigration Inflow (%) 3.115∗
(1.611)




Electoral System X X
Country Effect X X X X
Year Effect X X X X
Observations 167 122 122 108
Akaike Inf. Crit. 469.444 348.385 353.359 321.895
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 485.034 368.013 381.399 354.080
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The left panel, on the other hand, shows the marginal effect of the salience of immigration
on welfare policy position when voters who have a median view on immigration have a lower
level of income than average voters (µ̄−µ < 0). The model predicts that when voters’ views
on immigration and the redistribution issue are aligned (µ̄− µ < 0), right-wing parties will
converge to left-wing parties’ welfare policy position as the salience of immigration increases.
However, the difference between the welfare policy position of the left and right-wing parties
are not statistically significant regardless of the salience of immigration.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines how the increasing salience of immigration in Western Europe influ-
ences the welfare policy position of parties by changing the structure of political cleavage in
electoral competition. Applying the classic model of Roemer, I have demonstrated that when
immigration becomes salient and voters with low income are likely to be anti-immigrant,
left-wing parties have an incentive to converge to right-wing parties’ welfare policy posi-
tion. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project and several individual-level survey data, I
show that given the high salience of immigration, the left-wing parties’ welfare policy posi-
tion converges to right-wing parties’ position, especially when low-income voters have strong
anti-immigration attitudes.
These findings have an important contribution to the literature on the consequence of
the burgeoning anti-immigration sentiment in Western Europe. As immigration becomes
more and more salient, there have been lots of research on the consequences of the rise in
anti-immigration sentiment. Yet, they mostly focus on how it affects electoral outcomes,
the rise of radical right-wing parties, and immigration policies [e.g. 50, 13, 134, 24]. This
paper suggests that the rise of anti-immigration sentiment can influence politics beyond
the electoral outcomes and immigration policy and potentially have broader impacts on
individuals’ welfare.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the globalization backlash by showing why
it is challenging for left-wing parties to compensate people who suffer from economic global-
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ization. Economic globalization inevitably induces winners and losers, and compensation is
a key to manage the backlash against it [e.g. 62, 96]. While left-wing parties conventionally
play a role in providing compensation by expanding the welfare expenses, this paper shows
that as immigration becomes salient in electoral competition, it is difficult for left-wing par-
ties to maintain their welfare policy position. This finding shows a dilemma of globalization
that the rise of anti-immigration sentiment leads to a more conservative welfare policy, which
leads to another wave of backlash against globalization. Given that low-income voters are
disproportionately more anti-immigrant, it is challenging for left-wing parties to solve this
dilemma.
Despite these contributions, there is more ground to be covered. First, this paper includes
only a limited number of countries and periods. The analysis would benefit from including
additional countries and parties. Second, this paper uses only a single measurement of the
welfare position of parties based on the comparative manifesto data. While manifesto data is
one of the most widely used data to measure the policy positions of parties, it has limitations
as well [e.g. 102, 88]. Future work should incorporate a diverse set of data and methods to
measure and validate the welfare policy positions of parties. Lastly, this paper only focuses
on the supply side of the model, whereas the model relies on an assumption that voters
would choose parties that would maximize their benefits. Future research should investigate
whether these parties’ strategy is successful in elections.
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Figure 8: Conditional Effects of Salience of Immigration
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5.0 Conclusions
Over the last few decades, the flow of international migration has increased steadily,
and Europe is no exception from this trend [113]. Since the end of the Second World War,
Western European countries have been some of the most popular destinations for interna-
tional migrants from other parts of the world [30]. Particularly, since the EU enlargement
in 2004, which enables free movement from many Eastern European countries, the inflow of
immigrants to Western Europe has increased even more rapidly.
Consequently, immigration has become more politically salient in many European coun-
tries. With the fast growth of anti-immigration sentiment and the rise of far-right parties
whose main agenda is anti-immigration policies, immigration has become the center of Eu-
ropean politics in the last decade [e.g. 35, 52].
Many studies explore the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. There have been
burgeoning discussions over the causes and consequences of rising far-right populism and
anti-immigration sentiment in Western democracies. Many studies find that individuals with
high levels of anti-immigration attitudes likely vote for radical right-wing parties [52, 27], and
economic interests and cultural factors are strong predictors of anti-immigration sentiments
[130, 26, 57]. On the other hand, another strand of studies focuses on how such growing
anti-immigration sentiment and the rise of far-right parties affect political parties’ behaviors
such as their immigration policies [e.g. 134, 109, 52].
These previous studies primarily consider immigration as an inflow of labor forces that
creates competition for domestic workers or as a source of foreign influence that triggers
cultural backlash in receiving countries. Yet, immigrants are also political actors [e.g. 34],
and their relocation results in an inflow of political actors in receiving countries and exit of
political actors in sending countries. Depending on the political attributes of migrants and
the political environment they experience, international migration flows can have a range of
impacts on politics in both sending and receiving countries.
There is a small but growing literature that sees immigrants as political actors [e.g.
34, 46, 75]. Especially, as immigration become a salient issue in Western democracies, many
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studies explore how western democracies can politically integrate immigrants [e.g. 76, 75],
and how the inflow of immigrants would change the political competition of parties [e.g. 34].
Yet, as political actors, migrants’ political attributes have implications beyond political
integration in receiving countries. Migrants are embedded in transnational networks that
connect sending and receiving countries. Migrants can transfer not only financial remittances
but also social and political remittances to their home countries [118, 23, 41, 14, 29]. In other
words, migrants are the source of new ideas and ideologies in their home countries. Thus,
questions like who migrants are and what determines their political attitudes have important
political implications.
My dissertation builds on these previous studies. In this study, I explore how interna-
tional migration has varying impacts on politics in sending and receiving countries, depending
on who they are, where they are from, and where they arrive. In the first paper, I explore
the political attributes of emigrants and how their exit affects the distribution of voters in
their home countries, focusing on Eastern Europe, where the number of emigrants has been
increasing since the EU enlargement. I find that (1) emigrants from Eastern Europe tend
to be younger, highly educated, and politically more progressive, (2) hence the support for
far-right parties is higher in regions with higher emigration rates. These findings highlight
the importance of migrants’ political attributes by showing that migration can influence
political outcomes in sending countries by geographically sorting citizens by their political
preferences.
On the other hand, migrants’ political attitudes are not constant. Depending on what
they experience in receiving countries after they migrate, their political attitudes may vary.
In the second paper, I explore how political environments in host countries influence im-
migrants’ political attitudes. Many previous studies suggest that migrants become more
pro-democratic after moving to advanced democracies and transmit democratic values to
their home countries [118, 23, 14, 56]. However, migrants’ experiences vary widely by the
political environments in host countries, even within advanced democracies. When immi-
grants experience hostilities toward them, they likely become dissatisfied with the political
system of host countries and less attached to democratic values. Using the various kinds of
data from 10 Western European countries, I find that when immigrants live in regions with
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high support for far-right parties, they become more skeptical regarding democracy. This
finding deepens our understanding of the consequences of radical right-wing populism in
Western democracies. Given that a significant number of immigrants are from new, emerg-
ing democracies, the impacts of right-wing extremism in Western democracies can negatively
influence democratic consolidation beyond their borders.
Finally, in the last paper, I aim to answer why it is challenging for Western democracies
to alleviate the backlash against immigration, and the rise of radical populism, focusing on
the impacts of immigration on social democratic parties’ policy positions. The increasing
salience of immigration creates a challenge for left-wing parties. Conventionally, left-wing
parties are committed to both welfare expansion and pro-immigration policies. Yet, left-
wing parties rely on two groups of constituents with different policy preferences. While
highly educated, socially liberal constituents tend to be more pro-immigrant, the other type
of constituents with low-income levels tend to be more anti-immigrant [e.g. 57]. Given
this dilemma, I argue that when immigration becomes salient, parties need to adjust their
policy positions to maximize their vote share. By maintaining their conventional policy
positions on immigration policy, left-wing parties may lose a significant portion of their core
constituents. I find that when immigration becomes highly salient and voters with strongly
anti-immigration views are disproportionately more from the low-income segment of the
population, center-left parties tend to converge to a more conservative welfare policy position.
Conventionally, center-left parties have played crucial roles in economic globalization by
compensating losers of globalization by expanding welfare provision. Yet, this paper shows
that as immigration becomes salient, it is difficult for left-wing parties to maintain their
welfare policy position. The finding highlights a dilemma of globalization that the rise
of anti-immigration sentiment leads to a more conservative welfare policy, which leads to
another wave of backlash against economic globalization and immigration.
Throughout the three papers, this study demonstrates how important migrants’ political
attributes are (Essay 1), how anti-immigration sentiment in host countries can have detri-
mental effects on them (Essay 2), and finally how challenging it is for Western democracies
to prevent such spreads of anti-immigration sentiment given the high saliency of immigra-
tion (Essay 3). These findings contribute to the literature on the politics of international
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migration by drawing attention to the importance of migrants as political actors and the
downstream effects of the politicization of immigration in Western democracies.
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Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Who Emigrates? Descriptive Statistics of Individual-level Survey
A.1.1 Descriptive Statistics (LITS)
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics (LiTs 2010)
Variable n mean min max sd
Willing to Emigrate 6273 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.42
Age 6641 47.23 18.00 99.00 17.48
Female 6641 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.01
Education (EISCED) 6641 4.10 1.00 7.00 1.41
Anti-Immigrant 5619 1.31 0.00 2.00 0.70
Pro-Democracy 5963 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.50
Religiosity 6641 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.28
Unemployed 6641 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.24
Vote 6505 0.60 0.00 1.00 0.49
Satisfied with Econ 6506 2.40 1.00 5.00 1.03
To capture (potential) emigrants, and (potential) stayers from the six Eastern European
countries, we use LiTs from the all six Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia).
Willing to Emigrate: I measure individuals willingness to emigrate using a question asks
”Do you intend to move abroad in the next 12 months?” The responses to this question are
coded as binary, 1 indicating willingness to emigrate, 0 not willing to emigrate.
Education (EISCED): highest level of education is coded in 7 point scale of EISCED
category: 1: less than lower secondary, 2: lower secondary, 3: lower tier upper secondary, 4:
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upper tier upper secondary, 5:advanced vocational, sub-degree, 6:BA level, 7: higher than
MA degree.
Anti-Immigrant: Attitudes toward immigrants are measured using a question that asks
”if immigrants are a burden for society(2), valuable contribution (0) or have none of these
effects (1).”
Pro-Democracy: I measure individuals’ support for democracy using a question that asks
whether respondents agree with the statement that ”democracy is preferable to other forms
of political systems”. The responses to this question are coded as binary, 1 indicating a
preference for democracy, 0 a preference for other forms of political systems. In the survey,
an authoritarian government was listed as an example for the other political system.
Religiosity: I measure religiosity using a question asking if a respondent is ”a member of
religious institution”. Answers are coded as binary, 1 indicating an active member while 0
indicating passive or no membership.
Unemployed: I measure employment status using a question asking if a respondent is
”unemployed in last 12 months.” Responses are coded binary.
A.1.2 Descriptive Statistics (ESS)
In order to capture a sample of emigrants who live in other (Western) European countries,
I use European Social Survey data from 13 Western European countries (United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Swiss, Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark). On the other hand, to capture a sample of people who remain in their
home countries, I use the ESS from Eastern European countries (Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia). Latvia is excluded from this sample due to a lack of coverage
of the ESS data.
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics (ESS Wave 1-9)
Variable n mean min max sd
Emigrant 66662.00 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.16
Age (of emigration) 65733.00 46.11 0.00 110.00 18.58
Female 66526.00 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.00
Education(EISCED) 66057.00 3.82 1.00 7.00 1.57
Education(BA or higher) 66310.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.43
Anti-Immigrant 64302.00 2.59 1.00 4.00 0.90
Ideology 55991.00 5.27 0.00 10.00 2.29
Religiosity 65608.00 4.38 0.00 10.00 3.22
Emigrants: ESS asks respondents if they are born in country of their current residence,
when, and where they migrated from. Using these question, I could identify emigrants from
six Eastern European countries who live in other (Western) European countries. In order
to control for emigrants who migrated before they gain their suffrage, I subset the emigrant
sample only to people who emigrate at their age of 18 or older.
Age (of Emigration): ESS wave 5 to 9 provides the exact year of emigration while ESS
wave 1 to 4 provides the duration of their migration if emigrants stay in the country less
than 5, 10, 15, or 20 years. In order to estimate the precise age of arrival, I only use ESS
wave 5 to 9.
Education (EISCED): ESS uses the same EISCED 7 point scale of highest level of edu-
cation with LITs.
Anti-Immigrant: It is challenging to compare emigrants’ political attitudes in host coun-
tries with those who stay in home countries since their political environment is different.
Especially, it is hard to measure emigrants’ attitudes toward immigrants. ESS has several
different questions about attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, targeted respondents are em-
igrants, which means they themselves are immigrants in this context. Therefore, general
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questions regarding the attitudes toward immigrants might not be a good proxy for their
attitudes toward immigration. To address this concern, I use a question that asks their
attitudes toward immigrants with different race or ethnicity (”Do you agree with allowing
many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe?”). Using this question will
prevent emigrant respondents from considering immigrants in the survey question as them-
selves and provide a proxy for their attitudes toward minorities and cultural diversity. 1
indicates ”allowing many to come,” and 4 indicates ”allowing none of them to come.”
Ideology: SS does not have the identical question with LiTs that asks how supportive
respondents are for democratic regimes. ESS has a question with how satisfied with the
democracy in your country, but ’your country’ could mean the country of their current resi-
dence. Therefore, for the second best, more direct way to measure the political attitudes, I
use a following question: ”Where would you place yourself from 0(left) to 10(right) scale?”
Religiosity: ESS directly asks ”how religious are you in 0(not at all) to 10 (very religious)
scale.
As discussed in the manuscript, one challenge to use ESS to measure emigrants’ attributes
is that ESS estimates the post-emigration attributes. In order to address this issue, at least
for demographic variables, I select ones that are more likely to be determined pre-emigration
such as age (of emigration), gender, level of education. For these reasons, I did not include
current unemployment status, or satisfied with the national economy (not home country),
which are for sure be affected by emigration decision. Also, I only used the emigrants sample
who were older than 18.
A.1.3 (Potential) Emigrants vs Stayers
In addition to the visualization and the regression analyses reported in the main text, I
report the simple t-test results that show the differences between (potential) emigrants from
stayers. Confidence intervals reported in the tables are at 95% level.
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Table 16: T-Test: (Potential) Emigrants vs Stayers (LiTs)
Variable Emigrants Natives Difference CI.low CI.high
Age 36.71 50.86 14.15 13.26 15.04
Female 0.53 0.53 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Education (EISCED) 4.33 4.02 -0.31 -0.39 -0.23
Education (BA or higher) 0.207 0.162 -0.045 -0.068 -0.022
Unemployed 0.11 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
Satisfied with Econ 2.29 2.43 0.14 0.07 0.20
Support for Democracy 0.56 0.46 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06
Anti-Immigrant 1.22 1.35 0.13 0.09 0.18
Religiosity 2.80 3.00 0.20 0.12 0.27
Table 17: T-Test: Emigrants vs Stayers (ESS)
Variable Emigrant Native Diff CI.low CI.high
Age 28.33 46.54 18.21 17.43 18.98
Female 0.55 0.54 -0.01 -0.04 0.02
Education(EISCED) 3.60 3.81 0.20 0.04 0.36
Education(BA or higher) 0.41 0.25 -0.16 -0.19 -0.12
Ideology 5.15 5.27 0.12 -0.01 0.25
Anti-Immigrant 2.12 2.60 0.48 0.42 0.54
Religiosity 5.04 4.36 -0.68 -0.87 -0.48
A.2 Emigration and Far-Right Parties in Eastern Europe
A.2.1 Geographical Unit (NUTS) of Eastern Europe
NUTS is geographical unit that is comparable across EU member countries. NUTS 3
is the most disaggregated unit within the NUTS system, which is defined as ”small re-
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gions for specific diagnoses” by Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/
background)
Table 18: NUTS 3-Level Information (2013)
Country NUTS 3 Unit (2013) Count
Czech Republic Region (Kraje) 14
Poland Subregions (Podregiony) 72
Slovakia Regions (Kraje) 8
Slovenia Statistical regions (Statistične regije) 12
Latvia Statistical regions (Statistiskie re ‘gioni) 6
Estonia Groups of counties (Groups of Maakond) 5
A.3 Source of the Migration Data
This section reports the source of migration data as well as the method of each data
collection.
• Poland Statistical Office ”Statistics Poland”
(https://bdl.stat.gov.pl/BDL/dane/podgrup/temat)
Data on registration for permanent residence in gmina and on registration of departure
for permanent and long-term residence abroad is through PESEL (national registration
number) register collected by the Ministry of the Interior and Administration.
• Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia
(https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatDb/pxweb)
Data are collected through the statistical survey “Migrations” (SEL). Data in this survey
are collected from the administrative collection of the Ministry of the Interior, namely
the Central Population Register.
• Statistical Office of Slovak Republic
(https://slovak.statistics.sk/)
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The statistical survey on migration movement of population, every year organised by the
SO SR, is the main source of data on international migration. It is an exhaustive survey
conducted under the Programme of National Statistical Surveys by means of statistical
reports ´Report on Migration´. The Ministry of Interior of the SR is the administrative
source of data on acquisition and loss of citizenship of the SR.
• Estonia Statistical Office
(http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/dialog/statfile1.asp)
An emigration event occurs if a person’s residency index which at the beginning the year
was 1 obtains the value 0 by the end of the year and it is not a death event.
• Latvia Statistical Office
(https://data1.csb.gov.lv/pxweb)
Migration data is synthesized based on a various source of administrative data primarily
including Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA), State Social Insurance
Agency (SSIA).
• Czech Statistical Office
(https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf)
The data on migration were taken from the reports on migration (reporting units were
Registration offices of residence and district offices of the Foreign and Border Police
of the Czech Republic) between the years 2001 and 2004. Since 2005 they have been
electronically taken from the Ministry of Interior.
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A.3.1 Emigration and Far-Right Votes (Log Transformed)
Table 19: Emigration and Far-Right Votes (Log Transformed)
Dependent variable:















Lagged DV X X X
NUTS3 FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Observations 371 359 350
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
A.4 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable
A.4.1 Instrumental Variable Analysis for Alternative Classification of Far-right
Parties in Poland
All the radical right-wing parties in CHES are considered to be radical right wing parties
in other datasets (e.g. Comparative Manifesto Data) and previous studies except Law and
Justice (PiS) in Poland. Whereas CHES classifies PiS as a radical right wing party from
early 2000s, some previous studies categorize PiS as conservative party, and instead consider
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(LPR) as a radical right wing party in 2005, and 2007 elections 1. In the main text, I
followed the CHES coding. In the appendix, I replicate the same instrumental variable
approach, using the alternative coding that classifying LPR as far-right party in 2005, and
2007 elections. The results are consistent in terms of the direction of coefficient and the
statistical significance.
1CHES classifies LPR as confessional party, and Comparative Manifesto Project data consider LPR as
Christian Democratic Party.
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Table 20: IV Analysis (Poland) with Alternative Coding
Dependent variable:
Vote share of Far-Right Party
(1) (2) (3)








NUTS 3 FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Lagged DV X
Estimator IV IV IV
First Stage F 52.47∗∗∗ 43.730∗∗∗ 42.106∗∗∗
N 285 258 258
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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A.4.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis with Emigration Rates After the EU
Accession
Ideally, we would have data of the past emigration rates by destination, which would allow
me to use the past emigration rates to the UK exclusively to build an instrument. However,
such data is not available at the sub-national level (NUTS 3). For a robustness check, I
construct the instrument with the emigration share in 2004, at the year of EU enlargement,
instead of pre-EU emigration rates (UnemploymentUK,t × Emigration2004). This leverages
the fact that emigration to the UK has increased almost exclusively immediately after the
EU enlargement due to the free access to the UK labor market [115]. Table A. 21 reports the
results of this new identification. The results are mostly consistent with the results reported
in the main text.
Table 21: IV Analysis with 2004 Emigration Rates (Poland)
IV IV IV








NUTS 3 FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Lagged DV X
First Stage F 111.187∗∗∗ 113.053∗∗∗ 112.568∗∗∗
N 213 187 187
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
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Appendix B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Individual-Level Model to Predict Immigrants’ Attitudes
Figure 9: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients - Satisfied with Government
B.2 Validating the MRP with Synthesized Joint Distribution
It is difficult to validate the MRP with raking and synthetic joint distribution when it
comes to public opinion of immigrants, since the true population opinion is unknown. As
an alternative, to show the validity of this method, I show the correlation between the vote
share of far-right parties and prediction of vote share of far-right parties in the region (NUTS
1 or 2). ESS asks respondents what party they voted for in the last national election. Using
this question, I estimate the voting rate for far-right parties at the sub-national level and test
how well this estimate predicts the actual vote share of far-right parties. Since the actual
(population) vote share of a party in national election is known, I can evaluate how well
the estimate from MRP with raking and synthetic joint distribution predicts the true value,
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Figure 10: Individual-Level Demographic Coefficients - Trust in Parliament
compared to simple mean of vote for far-right parties at each sub-national unit.
First, I estimate the multilevel regression model to generate individual level estimate for
the vote for far-right parties. Below is the model:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(β0 + β
female · Femalei + βageage(i) + βeduedu(i) + βnutsnuts(i) + β
year
year(i))





For varying coefficients, I assign normal distribution with mean being 0, and standard
deviations (σage, σedu, σnuts, σyear estimated from data using weakly informative prior (σ ∼
Cauchy(0, 5)). I also add region level predictor with country indicator.
Demographic information in the model are important predictors of individual vote choice.
Particularly, age and education are some of the strongest predictors of far-right support.
There are other non-demographic variables that could predict vote for far-right parties ef-
fectively such as ideology or attitudes toward immigrants. Yet, in order to estimate the
public opinion at the sub-national level using Census data, we can only use variables that
are available in Census data.
Second step is to generate synthetic joint distribution using both survey information and
raking. Among eight Western European countries in the sample, three countries’ Census
data provide full joint distribution between all the variables included in the model above.
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Yet, other five countries provide joint distribution of only a few variables (gender, education,
region), and for some variables they only provide marginal distribution (age group). In order
to post stratify the estimate at the sub-national level, I synthesized the joint distribution of
all variables using raking with initial contingency table based on survey data.
The Pearson correlation between the actual vote share of far-right parties and estimates
using MrP with synthetic joint distribution is 0.6250, while the correlation coefficient with
sample mean is only 0.5001. This shows that while model prediction does not predict the
outcome of interest perfectly, it does reduce measurement error significantly compared to a
baseline that does not take Census information into account.
Figure 11: Vote for Far-right Parties (Model Comparison)
B.3 Conditional Effects by Immigrants’ Country of Origin
As an alternative approach to the table 11, below table report the regression analysis
between the political attitudes of immigrants, and the vote share of far-right parties using a
separate sample for EU immigrants and non-EU immigrants respectively.
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Table 22: Conditional Effects by Immigrants’ Country of Origin
Dependent variable:
Satisfied w Satisfied w Trust in
Democracy Government Parliament
Non-EU EU Non-EU EU Non-EU EU
FR Vote Share −0.366∗∗ 0.088 −1.046∗∗∗ −0.718∗∗ −0.160 −0.148
(0.170) (0.174) (0.307) (0.302) (0.102) (0.137)
Satisfied w Democracy 0.521∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(Native) (0.016) (0.018)
Satisfied w Government 0.618∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(Native) (0.038) (0.039)
Trust in Parliament 0.679∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(Native) (0.035) (0.036)
Pop.Density −0.0001 −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.00001 −0.00002 0.00002 −0.0001∗∗
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Foreign-born Share 0.826∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗ 0.173 0.749 −0.629∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.451) (0.654) (0.674) (0.267) (0.335)
Constant 3.469∗∗∗ 2.805∗∗∗ 2.463∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 1.534∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.115) (0.191) (0.196) (0.174) (0.179)
Region Effect X X X X X X
Year Effect X X X X X X
Observations 332 291 332 291 332 291
Akaike Inf. Crit. −436.060 −330.206 −81.326 −62.809 −603.628 −392.380
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −405.619 −300.819 −50.885 −33.423 −573.187 −362.994
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix C Appendix to Chapter 4
Whereas this paper mainly focuses on parties’ welfare policy positions, Roemer’s model
also produces the predictions regarding the immigration policy positions that when immi-
gration issue becomes salient, left and right-wing parties would converge on median voters’
view on immigration. Table A.1 investigate the impacts of salience of immigration on the
difference between immigration policy position of left and right wing parties. In order to
measure the immigration policy position, I rely on the Immigration Party Manifesto (IPM)
data from [32], which code parties’ policy position on immigration issue only using the mani-
festo data. IPM data is specialized in coding immigration policy positions, which CMP only
recently started including as a separate category.
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Table 23: Difference in Immigration Policy Positions (Left-Right)
Dependent variable:
Diff btw Immigration Policy Position (Left-Right)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salience −0.751∗∗ −0.800∗∗ −0.859∗∗ −0.855∗∗
(0.374) (0.382) (0.427) (0.342)






Country X X X X
Observations 54 54 50 46
Akaike Inf. Crit. −52.275 −40.695 −35.065 −49.132
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −44.319 −30.750 −25.504 −39.989
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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